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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article analyzes seventeen years under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) rulemaking 
mechanism and suggests changes to reinforce its successes 
while remedying its failures. Part I briefly discusses the 
legislative history of the rulemaking mechanism and policy 
justifications for its adoption within the DMCA scheme. 
Part II reviews legal and evidentiary standards of the 
rulemaking and recent changes to its administrative 
procedure. Part III provides an overview of the prior 
rulemakings and their impact on non-infringing uses, with 
a particular focus on the “e-book” and “cellphone 
unlocking” exemptions. Part IV applauds the Breaking 
Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015—which suggests 
numerous improvements to the rulemaking mechanism—
and then recommends other possible changes. Part V 
emphasizes the continued need for the rulemaking 
mechanism, but concludes with some modifications and 
restructuring.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The advancement and diffusion of knowledge is the only guardian 
of true liberty.” 
− James Madison1 
 
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”) to provide greater protection to copyright owners 
against unauthorized access and copying of their works.2 The Act 
prohibits circumventing technological protection measures 
(“TPMs”) and trafficking in tools that circumvent TPMs, but also 
provides seven permanent exemptions to these prohibitions.3 
Additionally, the DMCA institutes a periodic rulemaking 
proceeding to determine whether to grant additional exemptions 
from the DMCA prohibitions.4 The ultimate goal of such a 
rulemaking mechanism5 is to provide greater flexibility and 
responsiveness of copyright law to rapidly evolving technologies.6 
                                                                                                             
1 Letter from James Madison to George Thomson (June 30, 1825), in 
JAMES MADISON PAPERS, 1723–1859, available at http://www.loc.gov/item/ 
mjm019029. 
2 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998); Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)–(j) (2000); see also Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998, U.S. Copyright Office Summary 5, 6 (1998) [hereinafter U.S. 
Copyright Office Summary], http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf 
(discussing the DMCA exemptions). 
4 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(E) (2000); see also U.S. Copyright Office 
Summary, supra note 3. 
5 This Article uses the term “rulemaking mechanism” when discussing the 
triennial rulemaking proceeding under Section 1201 of the DMCA; similarly, 
terms “fail-safe mechanism” and “regulatory mechanism” refer to the above 
rulemaking and are used interchangeably. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(D) 
(2000). 
6 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998) [hereinafter Commerce 
Comm. Report] (Congress being “concerned that marketplace realities may 
someday dictate a different outcome, resulting in less access, rather than more, 
to copyrighted materials that are important to education, scholarship, and other 
socially vital endeavors,” decided “to modify the flat prohibition against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that control access to 
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This flexibility is meant to ensure that access to copyrighted works 
for legitimate purposes—such as education, scholarship, scientific 
research, comment, criticism, and other socially beneficial 
endeavors—is not unjustifiably hindered or suppressed.7 
Seventeen years have passed under the DMCA regime. Under 
this regulatory mechanism, the Register of Copyrights (“the 
Register”) and the Librarian of Congress (“the Librarian”) 
periodically engage in rulemaking proceedings to determine 
classes of copyrighted works that will be given exemptions from 
the DMCA.8 So far, there have been six rulemakings.9 Altogether, 
these represent seventeen years under the DMCA rulemaking 
mechanism, seventeen years of experience, and seventeen years of 
win-loss record for proponents of exemptions and public at large.10 
Experience has demonstrated that DMCA rulemaking has both 
benefits and drawbacks.11 A significant benefit of the mechanism 
is that it allows lawmakers to amend the law in a faster and more 
efficient manner than the traditional legislative process or court 
                                                                                                             
copyrighted materials, in order to ensure that access for lawful purposes is not 
unjustifiably diminished.”). 
7 Id. 
8 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000). 
9 The first rulemaking concluded in 2000, the second in 2003, the third in 
2006, the fourth in 2010, the fifth in 2012, and the sixth in 2015. See Section 
1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of Technological 
Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE [hereinafter 
Section 1201 Rulemakings], http://copyright.gov/1201/ (last visited Nov. 3, 
2015) (providing a full administrative record for all rulemaking proceedings); 
see also Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 79 Fed. Reg. 55,687 (proposed Sept. 
17, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry for 
the Sixth Rulemaking] (initiating the Sixth Rulemaking); Exemption to 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,944 (Oct. 28, 2015) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 2015 Exemption] (concluding the Sixth 
Rulemaking). 
10 Technically, seventeen years have passed under the DMCA regime as a 
whole; the actual DMCA rulemaking proceeding first commenced in 1999. See 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,139 (proposed Nov. 24, 1999) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (initiating the First Rulemaking). 
11 See infra pp. 259–62, 268–71. 
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proceedings.12 Consequently, rulemakings have become more 
flexible and are becoming broader both in number and scope.13 
Despite its legacy and importance, many believe that the 
rulemaking mechanism has not proven to be sufficiently 
effective.14 Critics of the process claim it is:  
                                                                                                             
12 See Arielle Singh, Agency Regulation in Copyright Law: Rulemaking 
under the DMCA and Its Broader Implications, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527, 
537 (2011) (giving an example that it took the court four years to enjoin 
Grokster case and eight years to rule on the VCR, while it took Congress six 
years to legislate for DAT tapes and eight years for the audio cassette). 
13 Thus, the number of exemptions increased from two in 2000 to six in 
2006 and 2010, eight in 2012, and ten in 2015. See Chapter 12 of Title 17: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) [hereinafter Section 1201 
Hearing] (statement of Rep. John Conyers Jr., Ranking Member, Comm. on 
Judiciary) (noting that the DMCA rulemaking proceeding “has resulted in 
dozens of exemptions being granted since 1998”); Exemption to Prohibition on 
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,574 (Oct. 27, 2000) (codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 2000 Exemption] (two exemptions granted); 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62,018 (Oct.  31, 2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 Exemption] (four exemptions granted); Exemption to 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,480 (Nov. 27, 2006) (codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 2006 Exemption] (six exemptions granted); 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,839 (July 27, 2010) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 2010 Exemption] (six exemptions 
granted); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260, 65,278–79 
(Oct. 26, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 2012 Exemption] 
(eight exemptions granted); 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,961–64 (not 
only has the 2015 Rulemaking adopted ten exemptions—twice as much as in 
2012—but it also covered twenty-two types of uses); see also Singh, supra note 
12, at 529 (emphasizing that the 2010 exemption was broader than the first three 
rulemakings—in the number, scope, and importance of the exemptions); see 
also Final Rule Published in Sixth Triennial Section 1201 Proceeding, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Oct. 27, 2015), available at http://copyright.gov/ 
newsnet/2015/600.html [hereinafter Copyright Office’s NewsNet 600] (noting 
the number of exempted uses in the 2015 Rulemaking). 
14 See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann & Gwen Hinze, DMCA Triennial 
Rulemaking: Failing the Digital Consumer, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 2–5 (Dec. 
1, 2005), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/dmca_rulemaking_broken.pdf 
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 Unduly burdensome — especially for proponents seeking 
renewals of prior exemptions, who are required to 
demonstrate actual or probable substantial harm to non-
infringing uses of copyrighted works in every 
rulemaking;15 
 Repetitive — specifically, due to the de novo standard of 
review that applies equally to petitions requesting new 
exemptions and those requesting renewals of the existing 
ones;16 
 Too narrow — generally, only few exemptions are granted 
upon each rulemaking, and those granted are usually 
limited to a narrow class of works, do not extend to 
circumvention tools, and sometimes last even less than 
three years;17 
                                                                                                             
(summarizing why the rulemaking does not effectively address concerns of 
digital consumers); see also Erik Stallman, A Qualified Win for Cybersecurity 
Researchers in DMCA Triennial Rulemaking, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 
(Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Stallman, A Qualified Win], https://cdt.org/blog/a-
qualified-win-for-cybersecurity-researchers-in-dmca-triennial-rulemaking/ 
(suggesting that DMCA rulemaking is “not the best vehicle for industrial 
policymaking”). 
15 See, e.g., Mark Gray, New Rules for a New Decade: Improving the 
Copyright Office’s Anti-Circumvention Rulemakings, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
759, 778–79 (2014) (noting that proponents of previously granted exemption 
“must point to non-existent or difficult-to-gather evidence of a harm that was 
mitigated by a previously granted exemption”); Marcia Hofmann & Corynne 
McSherry, The 2012 DMCA Rulemaking: What We Got, What We Didn’t, and 
How to Improve the Process Next Time, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2, 
2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/2012-dmca-rulemaking-what-we-
got-what-we-didnt-and-how-to-improve (discussing the numerous procedural 
and practical obstacles to obtaining exemptions); see also Stallman, A Qualified 
Win, supra note 14 (noting that complexity and limitations of the granted 
exemptions may undermine their usefulness). 
16 Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 16 (prepared statement of Mark 
Richert, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Am. Found. for the Blind) (discussing the burdens 
on proponents of recurring exemptions); see also Krista L. Cox, Flaws of the 
1201 Rulemaking Process, ARL POLICY NOTES (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://policynotes.arl.org/?p=852 (stating that rulemaking “process is extremely 
repetitive, resource consuming, and unnecessary”). 
17 See, e.g., Singh, supra note 12, at 529 (discussing the criticism that the 
rulemaking process is too narrow in scope); Pan Lee, et al., Report 2: Updating 
17 U.S.C. § 1201 for Innovators, Creators, and Consumers in the Digital Age, 
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 Too long — typically, a rulemaking proceeding takes about 
one year to conclude, with exception for the 2010 
Rulemaking that lasted almost twenty months;18 and 
 Overly complex — which makes the process less 
comprehensible for the general public and often forces its 
participants to engage attorneys,19 thus making it quite 
costly.20 
                                                                                                             
PUB. KNOWLEDGE (May 13, 2010), https://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
assets/uploads/blog/2_Circumvention.pdf (noting that Section 1201 has proven 
to be too narrow in its exceptions); see also Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 
13, at 66 (statement of McSherry, Intellectual Property Director of the EFF) 
(suggesting a reformation of the law that would apply exemptions to the tools of 
circumvention); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital 
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 564 (1999) (noting that because exemptions do not 
extend to circumvention tools, they are too limited in scope); see also 2015 
Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,963 (delaying implementation of the “car 
tinkering” and “medical devices” exemptions for twelve months). 
18 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,073 (proposed Oct. 
6, 2008) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (initiating the Fourth Rulemaking); 2010 
Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,825 (concluding the Fourth Rulemaking). 
19 See, e.g., Lohmann & Hinze, supra note 14, at 2–25 (noting that without 
expert assistance, individual digital consumers cannot successfully participate in 
the DMCA rulemaking process); Hofmann & McSherry, supra note 15 
(emphasizing that process tends to be dominated by legal experts); Press 
Release, New Copyright Rules Offer Improvements For Security Researchers, 
But Need For Legislative Reform Continues, OPEN TECH. INST. (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/new-copyright-rules-offer-improvements-for-
security-researchers-but-need-for-legislative-reform-continues/ (noting that the 
Librarian’s “new rules contain a number of wordy limitations that perpetuate the 
need for researchers, educators, and everyday consumers to consult legal 
counsel before proceeding with [their] activities”). 
The Register’s Recommendation and the Librarian’s Final Rule are often 
overwhelmed with legalese and confusing limitations on granted exemptions 
that make them difficult to understand by non-lawyers. For instance, in the most 
recent rulemaking, the Librarian’s Final Rule consisted of twenty-one pages, 
whereas the Register’s Recommendation was 403 pages. Not many can 
comprehend such a read. See 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,944; see infra 
p. 222 and note 33. 
20 This may discourage full-scale participation in the rulemaking. See It’s 
Time to Fix the DMCA, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
what-people-are-saying-about-reforming-the-dmca (last visited Dec. 23, 2015) 
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Recent developments in copyright and technology demonstrate 
that these calls for change are being heard and the drawbacks of 
DMCA rulemaking may be soon remedied by legislative action.21 
 In 2012, the Librarian of Congress denied the renewal 
of the cellphone unlocking exemption, which was 
followed by public outcry condemning this decision.22 
                                                                                                             
(stressing that “[t]he application process is incredibly onerous” and  “[i]n the 
absence of pro bono representation, it costs tens of thousands of dollars to hire a 
legal team to apply for each exemption” (citing Kyle Wiens, CEO, iFixit Repair 
Coal.)); see id. (adding that iFixit Repair Coalition wanted to petition for 
“exemptions to repair additional products (like hearing aids and wheelchairs),” 
but did not because could not afford the legal fees (citing Kyle Wiens, CEO, 
iFixit Repair Coal.)). 
21 See, e.g., Gray, supra note 15, at 774–98 (proposing shifting the burden 
for renewals, incorporating fair use test in the analysis of exemptions, revisiting 
classes of works approach); see also Hofmann & McSherry, supra note 15 
(suggesting that the rulemaking process be streamlined and simplified, and the 
Register revisit the long-standing de novo standard for renewals and be more 
receptive to granting exemptions for innovative uses of new and emerging 
technologies); Elizabeth F. Jackson, The Copyright Office’s Protection of Fair 
Uses Under the DMCA: Why the Rulemaking Proceedings Might Be 
Unsustainable and Solutions for Their Survival, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
521, 544–47 (2011),  (suggesting congressional intervention and restructuring 
the rulemaking proceedings); Singh, supra note 12, at 568–74 (discussing 
suggestions for improvement, including expanding the authority of the 
Copyright Office in the regulatory copyright regime); Samuelson, supra note 17, 
at 561 (recommending the Librarian examine the impact of anti-trafficking 
prohibitions on the ability of particular classes of users to make non-infringing 
uses of copyrighted works, and proposing to authorize the Librarian to consider 
other possible unintended adverse effects of the anti-circumvention provisions 
that may be adverse to the public interest); see also It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, 
supra note 20 (citing positions of public interest advocates that call for reform of 
the DMCA regime and rulemaking proceeding); see also New Copyright Rules 
Offer Improvements For Security Researchers, But Need For Legislative 
Reform Continues, supra note 19 (stressing “the continuing need for legislative 
reform to the 17-year-old DMCA”). 
22 2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 265–66, 65,278; see also Make 
Unlocking Cell Phones Legal, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/make-
unlocking-cell-phones-legal/1g9KhZG7 (last updated July 25, 2014) (petition 
signed by over 114,000 people calling to rescind the Librarian of Congress’s 
decision); see infra pp. 269–70 and notes 302–07. 
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This resulted in the passing of the Unlocking Consumer 
Choice and Wireless Competition Act of 2014.23 
 As a part of the Congress’ Copyright Review,24 the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet held hearings on Section 
1201 of the DMCA—examining the effectiveness of 
the DMCA rulemaking in the digital era. The 
Subcommittee concluded that Congress and the 
Register should make the process “more efficient and 
user-friendly.”25 
 The Register of Copyrights’ recent triennial rulemaking 
implemented procedural changes—such as to the 
petition and public comment phases of the 
proceeding—to enhance public understanding of the 
rulemaking process.26 
                                                                                                             
23 See also Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act of 
2014, Pub. L. No. 113–144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014); see infra p. 270 and notes 
310–11. 
24 On March 20, 2013, Maria Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, testified 
before Congress and called for a comprehensive update to the Copyright Act of 
1976. Within a month, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, 
announced that the House Subcommittee would review the Copyright Act. Since 
then, over twenty hearings were held on various copyright-related topics (e.g., 
Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired, Chapter 12 of Title 
17, Oversight of the U.S. Copyright Office, Music Licensing, etc.) and several 
bills were introduced to Congress (e.g., You Own Devices Act, Unlocking 
Technology Act of 2015, Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015). 
See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/03202013/Pallante%20Lecture.
pdf; see also Press Release: H. Judiciary Comm., Chairman Goodlatte 
Announces Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=1B5C521A-D006-
B517-9949-43E692E1E52E (last visited Apr. 30, 2014); Hearings: H. Judiciary 
Comm., http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings (last visited Dec. 14, 
2015) (providing a record for all of the Judiciary Committee’s hearings); 
Legislative Developments, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/legislation/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (providing an 
overview of copyright legislation proposed in the current Congress). 
25 Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers Jr., Ranking Member, Comm. on Judiciary). 
26 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 691–94. 
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 The Unlocking Technology Act has been re-introduced 
to Congress to amend the DMCA’s prohibition on 
circumvention of TPMs to allow circumventing and 
trafficking in tools to enable circumvention for non-
infringing uses, unless the intent is to infringe or 
facilitate copyright infringement.27 
 The Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act was 
introduced last year to Congress to improve the DMCA 
rulemaking and to ease restrictions on the use of certain 
statutory exemptions.28 Major consumer advocacy 
groups and even copyright holders’ representatives 
welcomed this Act.29 
                                                                                                             
27 If enacted, this Act can make the DMCA rulemaking meaningless. 
Because the author is overall supportive of the rulemaking mechanism, this 
Article will focus on discussion and analysis of the legislative efforts to improve 
the rulemaking, rather than abandoning it altogether. See Unlocking Technology 
Act of 2015, H.R. 1587, 114th Cong. (2015).  
28 See Sen. Ron Wyden, Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation, RON 
WYDEN SENATOR FOR OREGON (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/ 
priorities/breaking-down-barriers-to-innovation (providing a summary of the bill 
and its full text); Rep. Jared Polis, Polis, Wyden Introduce Breaking Down 
Barriers to Innovation Act to Modernize Outdated Copyright Laws, 
CONGRESSMAN JARED POLIS (Apr. 16, 2015), http://polis.house.gov/ 
news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397797; Breaking Down Barriers to 
Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 1883, 114th Cong. (2015). 
29 See, e.g., Letter from Erik Stallman, Dir. Open Internet Project, to Sen. 
Ron Wyden, in support of Breaking Down Barriers To Innovation Act, RON 
WYDEN SENATOR FOR OREGON (Apr. 17, 2015), available at 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=3e3e8e36-a745-4791-8e74-
ad170ec64e7a&download=1; Press Release, Statement of Sandra Aistars, CEO, 
Copyright Alliance On ‘The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015,’ COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://copyrightalliance.org/2015/04/statement_sandra_aistars_ceo_copyright_al
liance_tpa_bill#%2EVTAfOVxkdRo; Press Release, Public Knowledge 
Welcomes Sen. Wyden’s Proposal to Reform Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
press-release/public-knowledge-welcomes-sen-wydens-proposal-to-reform-
digital-millennium (statement of Sherwin Siy, Vice President of Legal Affairs, 
Pub. Knowledge); Mitch Stoltz, New “Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation 
Act” Targets Many of DMCA Section 1201’s Problems, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/new-breaking-
down-barriers-innovation-act-targets-many-dmca-section-1201s-problems 
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 The Register of Copyrights recently suggested that the 
process of renewing granted exemptions should be 
amended to establish a regulatory presumption favoring 
renewals.30 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee directed the Copyright 
Office to undertake a comprehensive study of the role 
copyright law plays in the software-enabled 
environment,31 so as “to better understand and evaluate 
                                                                                                             
(Notably, EFF is more enthusiastic about the Unlocking Technology Act, rather 
than the Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act; this conforms to their 
position expressed during the 1201 Section Hearing that Congress should 
overturn Section 1201 altogether.). 
30 See The Register’s Perspective On Copyright Review: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 21 (2015), http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
_cache/files/1c82a3a6-3b1b-4a51-b212-281454d1e56e/written-testimony-of-
register-maria-a-pallante.pdf [hereinafter Register’s Perspective On Copyright] 
(statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) 
(“[I]t would be beneficial for Congress to amend Section 1201 to provide that 
existing exemptions will be presumptively renewed during the ensuing triennial 
period in cases where there is no opposition.”). 
31 It is no coincidence that this request by the Senate was made during the 
last stages of the recent rulemaking proceeding—the very proceeding that 
presented new challenges to the DMCA prohibitions, which now apply to a 
variety of everyday software-containing products such as computer tablets, 
printers, cars, medical devices, etc. Nor is it a coincidence that this Senate’s 
request was authored by Sen. Grassley and Sen. Leahy. They were the ones who 
introduced the original bill for the Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless 
Competition Act in 2013.  See Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Grassley & Leahy Call For Copyright Study: Senators Seek 
Copyright Review to Provide Clarity for Consumers, CHUCK GRASSLEY 
SENATOR FOR IOWA (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/ 
news-releases/grassley-leahy-call-copyright-study (providing a summary of the 
request for a study and its full text); Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Leahy & Grassley Call For Copyright Study: Senators 
Seek Copyright Review to Provide Clarity for Consumers, PATRICK LEAHY 
SENATOR FOR VERMONT (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/ 
leahy-and-grassley-call-for-copyright-study (providing a summary of the request 
for a study and its full text); see also Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Praises 
Committee Passage of Cellphone Unlocking Bill, CHUCK GRASSLEY SENATOR 
FOR IOWA (July 10, 2014), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/grassley-praises-committee-passage-cellphone-unlocking-bill; Sen. 
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, SJC Members Introduce 
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how our copyright laws enable creative expression, 
foster innovative business models, and allow legitimate 
uses”32 in such an environment. 
 The most recent rulemaking has resulted in an 
unprecedented number of exemptions—ten in total—
covering as many as twenty-two types of uses.33 This is 
undoubtedly a big win for the digital rights community, 
researchers, educators, and end-users of works 
protected by TPMs, such as e-books, movies, video 
games, computer programs.34 
The Senate’s request for the copyright study directs the 
Copyright Office to examine the role copyright law plays in 
determining how the software-containing products can be used. 35 
The most recent rulemaking proceeding examined non-infringing 
uses of such products (e.g., computer tablets, smartwatches, smart 
                                                                                                             
Legislation To Restore Consumer Choice: Users Can “Unlock” Their 
Cellphones Under Bipartisan Bill, PATRICK LEAHY SENATOR FOR VERMONT 
(Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/sjc-members-introduce-
legislation-to-restore-consumer-choice. 
32 See Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, and Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
to Maria Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, PATRICK 
LEAHY SENATOR FOR VERMONT 1 (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-22-15%20Grassley-
Leahy%20USCO%20Study%20Request.pdf. 
33 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,961–64; Recommendation of the 
Register of Copyrights, Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding to 
Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE 6–7 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/registers-
recommendation.pdf [hereinafter Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking]; Copyright Office’s NewsNet 600, supra note 13. 
34 See Thomas Fox-Brewster, DMCA Ruling Ensures You Can’t Be Sued 
For Hacking Your Car, Your Games Or Your iPhone, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/10/27/right-to-tinker-victory. 
35 Grassley & Leahy Call For Copyright Study, supra note 31; see also 
Letter from Sen. Grassley and Sen. Leahy, supra note 32, at 2 (directing the 
Copyright Office to study and report on “whether, and to what extent, innovative 
services” and “the design, distribution, and legitimate uses of products are being 
enabled and/or frustrated by the application of existing copyright law to 
software in everyday products,” and “how the copyright law intersects with 
other areas of law in establishing how products that rely on software to function 
can be lawfully used,” etc.). 
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TVs, 3D printers, networked medical devices, cars, agricultural 
machinery, etc.).36 Both developments demonstrate the broad 
implications of the DMCA scheme and the rulemaking proceeding 
on the digital marketplace and people’s daily lives. This is largely 
because the DMCA applies to copyrighted software,37 which is 
now embedded in virtually every device and product people use in 
their daily routine.38 As a result, these devices have become 
subjected to the DMCA,39 including its rulemaking provisions.40 
This Article analyzes seventeen years under the DMCA 
rulemaking mechanism and suggests changes to reinforce its 
                                                                                                             
36 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,946–59 (providing an overview of 
all twenty-seven proposed classes of works for exemption); see also Section 
1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of Technological 
Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/1201 (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (providing an 
administrative record of all petitions for proposed exemptions in the Sixth 
Rulemaking). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980) (adding the definition of computer programs); 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1990) (listing the categories of protected works); H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 
(explaining that a category of literary works “also includes computer data bases, 
and computer programs,” which makes computer software subject to copyright 
protection). 
38 Grassley & Leahy Call For Copyright Study, supra note 31 (noting that 
copyrighted software “is now essential to the operation of our refrigerators, our 
cars, our farm equipment, our wireless phones, and virtually any other device 
you can think of”). 
39 See An Insecure Environment for Security Research: A Panel Discussion 
on Copyright Law, Your Property, and Cybersecurity, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH. (May 26, 2015), https://cdt.org/event/an-insecure-environment-for-
security-research-a-panel-discussion-on-copyright-law-your-property-and-
cybersecurity (discussing how the DMCA have come to apply to cars, tractors, 
printers, insulin pumps, etc. because of software embedded in many such 
products). 
40 This could be one of the reasons that each new triennial proceeding 
examines more and more classes of works proposed for exemption. See Section 
1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of Technological 
Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works: Proposed Classes of Works, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/1201 (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) 
(providing a brief summary of proposed classes of works in the 2012 
Rulemaking, ten it total); 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,946–55 (there 
were twenty-seven classes of works in the 2015 Rulemaking). 
13
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successes while remedying its failures. Part I briefly discusses the 
legislative history of the rulemaking mechanism and policy 
justifications for its adoption within the DMCA scheme. Part II 
reviews legal and evidentiary standards of the rulemaking and 
recent changes to its administrative procedure. Part III provides an 
overview of the prior rulemakings and their impact on non-
infringing uses, with a particular focus on the “e-book”41 and 
“cellphone unlocking” exemptions.42 Part IV applauds the 
Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015—which 
suggests numerous improvements to the rulemaking mechanism—
and then recommends other possible changes. Part V emphasizes 
the continued need for the rulemaking mechanism, but concludes 
with some modifications and restructuring. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The DMCA affords copyright holders more than copyright 
enforcement against circumvention of TPMs added to their works. 
Despite its goal to decrease instances of circumvention and to stop 
copyright piracy, the DMCA prohibitions have been used to stifle 
various legitimate activities.43 TPMs consequently are used to 
hinder personal and educational uses, free speech, scientific 
                                                                                                             
41 In this Article, the “e-book” exemption refers to the rulemaking 
exemption that covers “literary works distributed electronically (i.e., e-books), 
for use with assistive technologies for persons who are blind, visually impaired 
or have print disabilities.” See Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 6. 
42 In this Article, the “cellphone unlocking” exemption refers to the 
rulemaking exemption that covers computer programs that operate cellphones 
“to allow connection of a used device to an alternative wireless network.” See 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 6. 
43 See generally Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years under the DMCA, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended-
consequences-fifteen-years-under-dmca#_ednref1 (arguing how the DMCA 
chills free expression and scientific research, jeopardizes fair use, impedes 
competition and innovation, etc.); see also David Kravets, 10 Years Later, 
Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008 
3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later (discussing how the 
copyright holders abuse anti-circumventions provisions, including to suppress 
legitimate competition). 
14
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research and innovation, of both copyrighted works (e.g., movies, 
video games, books, computer programs) and various software-
containing devices (e.g., smartwatches, smart TVs, printers, 
medical devices, agricultural machinery, etc.).44 The unintended 
consequences of the DMCA prohibitions resulted in cellphones, 
computer tablets, cars, tractors, etc. that are locked to a certain 
manufacturer or service provider.45 As a result, not only does the 
DMCA often limit the end-users’ ability to use their own devices 
as they see fit (i.e., personal uses),46 but it also chills scientific 
research and security testing in these industries (i.e., fair uses) as 
researchers and scholars cannot freely test these devices without 
running into a risk of the DMCA liability.47 
Further, copyright owners more frequently use TPMs for 
                                                                                                             
44 See sources cited supra notes 38–39; see also Review of technological 
protection measures exceptions, House of Representatives, Standing Comm. on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Feb. 2006, 12 (Austl.) [hereinafter Australian 
Review of TPMs Exceptions], http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/ 
Committees/House_of_representatives_Committees?url=laca/protection/report.h
tm (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) (discussing similar problems in Australia, 
specifically, that anti-circumvention laws often prevent non-infringing uses of 
digital material and expand beyond the simple copyright enforcement). 
45 Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years under the DMCA, supra note 
43. 
46 An Insecure Environment for Security Research, supra note 39 
(discussing how the DMCA provisions limit consumers’ ability to use, study, or 
modify products they buy legitimately). 
47 Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years under the DMCA, supra note 
43 (reviewing extensive litigation by Apple, Sony, and Microsoft against 
journalists, publishers, researchers, scientists, programmers, and members of the 
public that have chilled their legitimate activities and deterred them from 
sharing their conclusions, findings, and research results with the public); see 
also EFF Wins Petition to Inspect and Modify Car Software: Exemption 
Requests Also Approved for Tweaking Abandoned Videogames, Jailbreaking 
Phones and Tablets, and Remixing Videos, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 27, 
2015), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-wins-petition-inspect-and-modify-
car-software (noting that because of the DMCA broad prohibitions to unlock 
access control TMPs on the software, car companies have been threatening legal 
action against anyone who tried to unlock TMPs, regardless of whether the 
reason is legitimate or not); see also It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra note 20 
(arguing that “overbroad use of the DMCA has been one of the main threats to 
independent research in the technology space” (citing Andy Sellars, Fellow, 
Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y)). 
15
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purposes that go well beyond and are often unrelated to copyright 
protection itself.48 As an example, TPMs are often used to control 
the market for copyrighted works (e.g., by locking devices to 
certain software and services and/or using geographical 
segmentation of markets) or to suppress legitimate competition 
(e.g., by blocking aftermarket competition and hindering 
independent security testing).49 Thus, copyright holders frequently 
use anti-circumvention measures as anti-competitive tools.50 This 
is not the likely outcome that Congress envisioned when the 
DMCA was drafted in 1998. As a result, similar to anti-
circumvention laws in other countries,51 the DMCA stifles both 
                                                                                                             
48 See Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, note 33, at 2 
(noting that Section 1201 impacts “a wide range of consumer activities that have 
little to do with the consumption of creative content or the core concerns of 
copyright”); Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 43 (testimony of 
McSherry, Intellectual Prop. Dir., EFF) (arguing that the DMCA has been “used 
to thwart activities that are not just legal but that have nothing to do with 
copyright”); Kravets, supra note 43 (emphasizing that the DMCA provisions are 
often “used in cases that have nothing to do with copyright”). 
49 See sources cited supra note 43; see infra note 50; see also Gwen Hinze, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation Submission to the Gowers Review of U.K. 
Intellectual Property Law, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 9–10 (Mar. 27, 2006), 
https://w2.eff.org/global/uk/EFF_Gowers_submission.pdf. (examining anti-
competitive impacts of the DMCA provisions); Parker Higgins, Jailbreaking Is 
Not A Crime—And EFF Is Fighting To Keep It That Way, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/jailbreaking-not-
crime-and-eff-fighting-keep-it-way (noting that manufacturers often use 
copyright law to increase their control of secondary uses and markets, and to 
suppress competition). 
50 In sum, TPMs have been used: (i) to ensure control over a technological 
platform (e.g., by locking iPhone and iPad consumers into buying digital music 
and apps from iTunes and App stores, or by locking Kindle into Amazon’s 
Kindle store), or (ii) to enforce geographical segmentation of markets (e.g., by 
region-coding for DVDs, Sony PlayStations, and 2-D printers, or geo-blocking 
of movie- and video-streaming), or (iii) to control access to devices that are not 
even protected by copyright law (e.g., to block aftermarket competition in 
garage door openers, 2-D printer cartridges, videogame console accessories, 
medical devices, computer tablets, cars, etc.). Id.; see also sources cited supra 
notes 46–47. 
51 Australian Review of TPMs Exceptions, supra note 44; see also David 
Ray, Fair Use in the Digital Age: Theoretically Sound But Practically 
Impossible?, CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDY & RESEARCH ON INTELLECTUAL 
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innovation and competition in technology and entertainment 
markets.52 
In contrast to other countries, the United States has a safety 
valve—the DMCA fail-safe mechanism—that can help fight, or at 
least neutralize, some of these harms.53 The DMCA regulatory 
mechanism is a unique creation of the U.S. copyright system.54 In 
accord with the constitutional directive of the Copyright Clause55 
and fair use doctrine codified in Section 107 of the Copyright 
Act,56 this mechanism seeks to achieve a healthy balance between 
the competing interests of the copyright holders (i.e., content 
                                                                                                             
PROP. (2009) (on file with author) (noting that most EU countries have not taken 
sufficient steps to ensure private copying and fair use exceptions to TPMs, and 
as a result, the anti-circumvention provisions made to allow for fair use, in most 
cases either have not been implemented by the EU countries or have been 
simply denied by their courts). 
52 Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 43 (testimony of McSherry, 
Intellectual Prop. Dir., EFF); see also Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years 
under the DMCA, supra note 43. 
53 Gray, supra note 15, at 773–72 (noting that rulemaking was meant to be 
“a safety valve to problems with the DMCA”); see also Kravets, supra note 43 
(stating that the DMCA scheme “includes a safety valve intended to combat 
such abuses [e.g., suppression of legitimate competition]”). 
54 Australia is the only other country in the world that has similar 
rulemaking provisions. But they were enacted only in 2006, which is eight years 
after the DMCA rulemaking was instituted. Plus, the only reason for adoption of 
such a procedure was to comply with the terms of the Free Trade Agreement 
with the U.S. See Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/au/au169en.pdf (amending Section 
249 of the Copyright Act 1968); The Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, ch. 17, art. 17.4, para. 7, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (eff. Jan. 1, 2005), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file469_5141.pdf; see also 
Review of Technological Protection Measure Exceptions Made Under the 
Copyright Act 1968, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T: Attorney-General’s Department (on 
file with author) (providing an overview of the rulemaking held in 2012–2013 
and guidance material about rulemaking procedure itself). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
56 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 
(allowing fair uses of copyrighted material, including for purposes of criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, etc.). 
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creators) and the public at large (i.e., content users, including 
ordinary consumers, educators, researchers, and copyright holders’ 
competitors, etc.). 
 
A.  Creation of the DMCA Section 1201 Rulemaking Mechanism 
 
In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA to bring U.S. law into 
compliance with the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
(“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty.57 Provisions of these treaties required that 
country-members “provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological 
measures”58 used by copyright owners to protect their works from 
unauthorized access.59 But these provisions were very broad and 
did not define the terms “effective” and “technological 
measures.”60 The treaties instead merely established general 
                                                                                                             
57 See generally Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998); see 
also U.S. Copyright Office Summary, supra note 3, at 3–4; Notice of Inquiry for 
the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,687; WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, 
Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295166#P87_12240 (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2015); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 20, 
1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/text.jsp?file_id=295578#P141_21174 (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
58 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 57 (requiring countries to 
“provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under th[ese] Treat[ies] or the Berne 
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not 
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law”); WIPO Performances 
& Phonograms Treaty, supra note 57 (enacting similar provisions as in the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty); see also Urs Gasser & Michael Girsberger, 
Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of Technological 
Measures in EU-Member States, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 6 
(Nov. 2004), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/eucd.pdf (discussing anti-
circumvention provisions of the WIPO treaties). 
59 Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 58, at 6. Notably, although the 
rulemaking was adopted within the DMCA legal framework as a part of 
Congress’s legislative action to implement two WIPO treaties, no such provision 
was required under either treaty. 
60 Id. 
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guidelines, giving member countries wide discretion to introduce 
their own definitions and set their own scope of protection.61 
Congress consequently defined TPM as “a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work”62 protected 
under the Copyright Act.63 Congress also set forth the scope of 
protection against circumventing such TPMs by defining the act of 
circumvention as any act “to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or 
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the 
copyright owner.”64  
The problem with these definitions is that Section 1201(a) 
applies too broadly. Not only does this Section extend to every act 
of circumvention, regardless of whether the circumvention is 
actually infringing upon copyright,65 but it also applies to all 
TPMs, despite that some of them are used for purposes which 
exceed the scope of copyright protection.66 This broad application 
has partially contributed to the problems with the DMCA 
scheme.67 In order to eliminate the potential impact of such broad 
application, the DMCA has divided TPMs into two categories—
“access controls”68 and “copy controls.”69 Circumvention of access 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. 
62 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(B) (2000). 
63 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A); Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 58, at 7 n.14. 
64 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2000); Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 58, at 
7 n.14. 
65 Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 58, at 9 (discussing similar issues with 
the Article 6(1) of the European Union Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC, 
particularly, that it does not concern whether the act of circumvention actually 
infringed copyrights or not, rather the act alone is relevant); Directive 2001/29, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, art. 6(1), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 6 (EC) [hereinafter the EUCD], 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0029 
(directing all member states to “provide adequate legal protection against the 
circumvention of any effective technological measures, which the person 
concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to know, 
that he or she is pursuing that objective”). 
66 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
67 See sources cited supra notes 48–50. 
68 The term stands for technologies used by copyright holders to protect 
access to their works, e.g., password-protected access to an e-book upon 
payment or subscription. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(B) (2000); see 
 
19
Koberidze: The DMCA Rulemaking Mechanism: Fail or Safe?
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
230 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:3 
controls is prohibited.70 But circumvention of copy controls is 
permitted to ensure that the public at large (content users) have the 
ability to make fair and other non-infringing uses of copyrighted 
material.71 
Congress, pressured by copyright holders and their 
representatives,72 imposed two distinct prohibitions: a ban on acts 
of circumvention (the “act prohibition”) and a ban on the 
distribution of tools and technologies used for circumvention (the 
“tools prohibition”).73 As a result, the distinction between the 
                                                                                                             
also Circumventing Copyright Controls, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, 
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/circumventing-copyright-controls (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2015) (explaining the difference between access and copy controls). 
69 The term stands for technologies employed by copyright holders to 
restrict copying, distribution, or other uses of their works in the exercise of the 
authors’ exclusive rights under Section 106 of the Copyright Act, e.g., e-book 
interface that does not allow one to save it to any device or to print-out more 
than certain limited amount of pages at a time, or to use a read-aloud function. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2)(B) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); Gasser & 
Girsberger, supra note 58, at 7; see also Circumventing Copyright Controls, 
supra note 68. 
70 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000); see also Circumventing Copyright 
Controls, supra note 68. 
71 Id.; see also U.S. Copyright Office Summary, supra note 3, at 4 (noting 
that Section 1201 does not prohibit circumventing copy controls applied to the 
work because copying of a copyrighted material can be a fair use under certain 
circumstances). 
72 During the DMCA debate in 1997–1998, the content industry was 
represented by Hollywood (Motion Picture Ass’n of Am.), record labels (RIAA) 
and music publishers (ASCAP, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, S/w Publishers Ass’n) 
who argued for a greater copyright protection. See generally Bill D. Herman & 
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content Analysis of 
The DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121 (2006); 
see also Kravets, supra note 43 (noting that Hollywood secured “a still-troubling 
anti-circumvention rule” that generally prohibits consumers to bypass copy 
control TPMs). 
73 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000) (the “act” prohibition); 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(2), (b) (2000) (the “tools” prohibition to traffic in any technology, 
product, service, or device to circumvent access and copy controls applied to 
copyrighted works); see also Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years under 
the DMCA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/wp/unintended-
consequences-under-dmca (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (explaining the two 
distinct prohibitions established by the DMCA). 
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access control and copy control TPMs became meaningless. 
Without a technology to circumvent copy controls,74 only few 
users can take advantage of this “generous” permission to bypass 
copy control TPMs.75 Moreover, because some copyright holders 
merge access control and copy control TPMs into one, those users 
who could theoretically bypass copy controls (which is not 
prohibited) would not be able to do so without also circumventing 
access controls (which is prohibited).76 
Recognizing the risks of the overly broad prohibitions on 
circumvention of access controls, Congress also provided 
exemptions to them.77 Again, Congress understood that the lack of 
ability to waive such a broad prohibition could someday 
undermine otherwise legitimate uses of copyrighted works 
protected by TPMs.78 The result would significantly tip the balance 
in favor of copyright holders’ interests in protecting their works, 
while unduly limiting the general public in accessing such works to 
make non-infringing uses of them.79 Constitutionally mandated to 
                                                                                                             
74 Because the DMCA outlawed the manufacture, sale, distribution, etc. of 
such tools and technologies, not many will take a risk of the DMCA liability for 
supplying a technology, device or service that enables users to bypass copy 
controls. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2010) (subjecting Section 1201 violators to civil 
penalties, including statutory damages of $200–$2,500 per act of circumvention 
or device to circumvent); 17 U.S.C. § 1204(b) (2010) (subjecting Section 1201 
violators to fines as high as $500.000–$1 million, or even a jail time (five to ten 
years of imprisonment)). 
75 Fred von Lohmann, DMCA Triennial Rulemaking: Failing Consumers 
Completely, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 30, 2005), https://www. 
eff.org/deeplinks/2005/11/dmca-triennial-rulemaking-failing-consumers-
completely (pointing out that unless a user is an engineer or a computer scientist, 
or can afford to hire one, the user is not likely to be able to benefit from any 
exemptions). 
76 Circumventing Copyright Controls, supra note 68. 
77 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)–(j) (2000); see also supra note 3. 
78 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6; see also Notice of Inquiry for 
the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,687–88. 
79 See supra notes 55–56; 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2005) (permitting educational 
uses of copyrighted material, including in the course of face-to-face teaching, a 
live classroom session, etc.); 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2004) (affording certain uses of 
computer programs, such as maintenance and repair, etc.); Notice of Inquiry for 
the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,688, 55,690 (noting that Congress 
recognized importance of protecting non-infringing uses that could be affected 
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maintain this balance,80 as well as pressured by educators, 
technologists, and consumer advocacy groups to remedy potential 
misbalance,81 Congress subjected the DMCA prohibitions to a 
number of permanent exceptions.82 
Given the changing marketplace realities and rapidly evolving 
technologies, Congress understood that the DMCA required a 
certain level of flexibility to keep pace with such changes and 
advances.83 But Congress felt that exemptions would not be 
sufficient to eliminate the “threat of a diminution of otherwise 
lawful access to works and information.”84 To afford flexibility to 
adapt to changing and unforeseeable realities, Congress added an 
ongoing administrative rulemaking proceeding to the DMCA 
scheme.85 This fail-safe mechanism was meant to keep track of 
developments in the marketplace for copyrighted works and to 
allow temporary exemptions when necessary to preclude 
diminution in the availability of a particular class of works to 
                                                                                                             
by Section 1201 prohibitions, especially in the light of rapidly advancing 
technologies). 
80 See supra note 55. 
81 See Herman & Gandy, supra note 72, at 138, 152 (generally discussing 
that educators, technologists, and civil society advocates (e.g., the Digital Future 
Coalition) called for limits to broad grants of protection afforded by the 
DMCA). 
82 See sources cited supra note 3; see also Singh, supra note 12, at 544 
(discussing the reasons behind congressional decision to provide the statutory 
exemptions and institute the triennial rulemaking process). 
83 Singh, supra note 12, at 529 (noting that because Congress recognized it 
could not predict the future technology landscape, it included the rulemaking 
proceedings in the DMCA scheme to create flexibility (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998))). 
84 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 36; see also Notice of Inquiry 
for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,688. 
85 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000); Singh, supra note 12, at 529 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998)); see id. at 541 (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1 and pt. 2, at 36–37 (1998)); see also Notice of Inquiry 
for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,687–88 (noting that as originally 
drafted, the bill only provided for permanent exemptions, but no exemption 
process (citing S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 13–16 (1998)); U.S. Copyright Office 
Summary, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing the rulemaking proceeding as one of 
the broadest exemptions adopted by the DMCA). 
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consumers who want to make legitimate uses of them.86 
As enacted in Section 1201(a), this mechanism directs the 
Librarian, the Register, and the Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Information of the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA’s 
Assistant Secretary”)87 to engage in the triennial rulemaking 
proceedings to determine which copyrighted works, if any, should 
be exempted from the access control prohibitions.88 Thus, the 
Register shall consult with the NTIA’s Assistant Secretary and 
make a recommendation to the Librarian as to whether TPMs that 
control access to a particular class of copyrighted works are likely, 
to adversely affect the ability of certain groups of users to make 
non-infringing uses of these works in the succeeding three-year 
period.89 Based on the Register’s recommendation, the Librarian 
decides which classes of works to exempt from the prohibition on 
circumventing access control TPMs for the succeeding three-year 
period.90 A potential issue, however, is that the Librarian’s 
authority is limited to adoption of exemptions only for 
circumventing access control TPMs.91 He has no authority to grant 
                                                                                                             
86 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 36 (explaining that the 
rulemaking “mechanism would monitor developments in the marketplace for 
copyrighted materials, and allow the enforceability of the prohibition against the 
act of circumvention to be selectively waived, for limited time periods, if 
necessary to prevent a diminution in the availability to individual users of a 
particular category of copyrighted materials”). 
87 See About NTIA, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/about (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (stating that the 
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information leads the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (“NTIA”), located within the U.S. Department of Commerce). 
88 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000); see also Understanding the Section 
1201 Rulemaking, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/1201/ 
2015/2015_1201_FAQ_final.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (providing a brief 
overview of the Section 1201 rulemaking); see additionally H.R. REP. NO. 105–
796, at 64 (1998) [hereinafter Conference Report] (explaining that “[t]he 
determination [of affected classes of works] will be made in a rulemaking 
proceeding on the record”). 
89 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000); Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,688. 
90 Id. 
91 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). For clarity and simplicity, exemptions from the 
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exemptions for manufacturing and trafficking in products and 
services to circumvent these TPMs.92 
 
II. RULEMAKING PROCEEDING 
 
Pursuant to Section 1201(a)(1)(C), the DMCA rulemaking 
proceeding is to be conducted by the Register (who is also the 
Director of the Copyright Office)93 and overseen by the 
Librarian.94 Unfortunately, Congress provided little guidance for 
the rulemaking process itself.95 Section 1201(a)(1)(C) provided no 
                                                                                                             
Section 1201(a)(1) prohibition to circumvent access control TPMs that are 
adopted by the Librarian are hereinafter referred to as “rulemaking exemptions.” 
Similarly, discussion of exemptions considered or declined by the Librarian in 
the rulemaking proceeding refers to exemptions from the prohibition to 
circumvent access controls applied to copyrighted works. 
92 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2), (b) (2000); Register’s Recommendation for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 10. 
93 It is no coincidence that Congress entrusted the Register to aid the 
Librarian in the rulemaking proceeding. Since its creation in 1897, the 
Copyright Office, as a part of the Library of Congress, has proven to be a 
tremendous asset to Congress itself. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000); 
Conference Report, supra note 88, at 64 (entrusting the Register to conduct the 
rulemaking proceedings); see also Oversight of the U.S. Copyright Office: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2, 6 (2014) (statement of Maria A. 
Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (discussing the role of 
the Copyright Office in the copyright system and its legal and policy work 
performed, including policy assistance and expert studies to Congress and to the 
public, legal assistance to federal agencies, conducting rulemakings, etc.); see 
also The Register’s Perspective On Copyright Review, supra note 30, at 4–5 
(summarizing the Copyright Office’s work during the last four years); see also 
Overview of the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright. 
gov/about (last visited Dec. 13, 2015); see additionally Strategic Plan 2016-
2020: Positioning the United States Copyright Office for the Future, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE 4, http://copyright.gov/reports/strategic-plan/USCO-
strategic.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2015) (summarizing the role of the Copyright 
Office in balancing copyright holders’ rights with the public interest). 
94 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(B) (2000). 
95 Conference Report, supra note 88; see id. (prescribing only that “the 
Register of Copyrights will conduct the rulemaking, including providing notice 
of the rulemaking, seeking comments from the public, consulting with the 
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of 
Commerce and any other agencies that are deemed appropriate, and 
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instruction as to how the Copyright Office must conduct the 
proceedings, or what weight should be given to the opinion of the 
NTIA’s Assistant Secretary.96 Nor did the DMCA define the term 
“a particular class of copyrighted works,” as to which the 
exemptions to be considered by the Register and the Librarian, or 
provide the standard of harm to justify such exemptions.97 
Left with such little statutory direction, the Register faced a 
hard task of defining the process and other applicable legal 
standards.98 To fill in the gaps in the statutory language, the 
Register has often resorted to the legislative history of the DMCA, 
and more specifically, to the Reports of the House of 
Representatives when the DMCA was drafted and enacted.99 For 
instance, based on the hint that Congress left in one of these 
reports—specifically, that 1201 rulemaking was to be conducted 
“as typical with other rulemaking under title 17”100—the Register 
decided to consult with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
that governs rulemaking under Title 17 and sets forth the general 
principles of agency rulemaking.101 Consequently, the Register 
construed the 1201 rulemaking proceeding as one of a notice-and-
comment type, which seems more appropriate (than, the formal 
type), given Congress’ goal of DMCA’s flexibility.102 
                                                                                                             
recommending final regulations in the report to the Librarian”). 
96 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(B); Gray, supra note 15, at 764. 
97 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(B); Gray, supra note 15, at 764. 
98 Gray, supra note 15, at 764. 
99 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,688–90; 
see also Gray, supra note 15, at 765; Singh, supra note 12, at 545 n.123; see 
also Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 36–37; Section-by-Section 
Analysis of H.R. 2281 as passed by the United States House of Representatives 
on August 4, Comm. of Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (1998) [hereinafter House 
Manager’s Report]; Conference Report, supra note 88, at 64. 
100 Conference Report, supra note 88, at 64; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,688, 55,690. 
101 17 U.S.C. § 701(e) (1998); Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, 
supra note 9, at 55,689. 
102 Singh, supra note 12, at 542 (noting that “[m]ost agencies choose the 
latter because it is less cumbersome,” and  “[g]iven this general preference as 
well as rapid technological advances and the goal of flexibility, this notice-and-
comment approach would appear to be the obvious form for the DMCA's 
rulemaking process”). 
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But that was only the beginning of the journey. Other 
important issues were to be resolved by the Register and the 
Copyright Office, such as the burden of proof on proponents of and 
opponents to exemption, the extent of harm necessary to justify 
exemption and, amongst others, the definition of a class of works 
to be exempted.103 
 
A.  Established Legal and Evidentiary Standards 
 
Since the DMCA rulemaking mechanism was instituted, the 
Copyright Office has been trying to define the standards of the 
proceeding by referring to the statutory language and congressional 
intent in the House Reports.104 Although the Register refined her 
interpretations of that intent over time,105 legal and evidentiary 
standards of the process have been relatively finalized in the last 
two rulemakings, and fully outlined by the Register in the 2015 
proceeding.106 This part will discuss the standards of the 
rulemaking proceeding as defined by the Copyright Office. 
 
1. Burden of Proof 
 
Those who seek an exemption carry the burden of proof against the 
prohibition on circumvention of access control TPMs.107 To satisfy 
                                                                                                             
103 Gray, supra note 15, at 764. 
104 Id. at 765; see also Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra 
note 9, at 55,688–90; Singh, supra note 12, at 545. 
105 Gray, supra note 15, at 764–69 (discussing the evolution of the 
Copyright Office’s approach to the rulemaking proceedings, e.g., rejecting 
“user-based” approach in defining a class of works in 2000 and 2003 
rulemakings, but applying it in the following rulemakings); see also Jackson, 
supra note 21, at 533–40 (providing an overview of the rulemakings—in 2000, 
2003, 2006, and 2009—noting the Copyright Office’s broadened interpretation 
of “class of works” and lowered standard of proof for some classes of works). 
106 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
13–19; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,689–91; 
see also Singh, supra note 12, at 547. 
107 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2011) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the 
proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof.”); 2015 Exemption, supra 
note 9, at 65,945; Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra 
note 33, at 13; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 
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this burden, proponents of an exemption must demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the harm alleged “is more likely 
than not.”108 This rule, the Copyright Office justified, stems from 
Section 1201(a)(1)(C) itself,109 as well as from general principles 
of agency rulemaking under the APA.110 Particularly, Section 
1201(a)(1)(B)-(C) requires a demonstration that individual users 
are, or are likely to be adversely affected by the prohibition on 
circumvention of access control TPMs.111 The APA, in turn, 
requires proponents to support their submissions by “reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence.”112 When a proponent 
                                                                                                             
55,689. 
108 U.S. Copyright Office, Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights 
in RM 2008-8: Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention 
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies 10 (2010) 
[hereinafter Register’s Recommendation for the Fourth Rulemaking]; see also 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14 
(emphasis added) (citing Register’s Recommendation for the Fourth 
Rulemaking, at 10). 
109 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000) (emphasis added); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14. 
110 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2011); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14. 
111 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000) (emphasis added); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14; Notice of 
Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,689. 
112 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2011) (emphasis added); Notice of Inquiry for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,689 (emphasis added); see also Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14 (emphasis 
added); see id. at 14 n.50; see also Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981). 
The Copyright Office explained that preponderance of evidence standard 
conforms to basic principles of administrative law and referred to the “reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence” language in the APA to support its 
position. Then, the Office cites the Steadman case, which held that the APA 
“was intended to establish a standard of proof and that the standard adopted is 
the traditional preponderance-of-the evidence standard.” Such an approach tends 
to blend two different standards—substantial evidence and preponderance of 
evidence—in one. The DMCA itself does not provide any reference to the 
substantial evidence burden of proof. But the statutory language “are, or are 
likely to be” is closer to the preponderance of evidence standard, and is 
therefore, more appropriate (though not the most optimal) for the purposes of 
the DMCA rulemaking than the substantial evidence standard. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000). 
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satisfies the burden in justifying an exemption, the burden then 
shifts to an opponent to rebut this evidence by showing that 
exemption is not justified.113 
 
2. Standard of Proof 
 
To satisfy the burden of proof, those who seek an exemption 
for a particular class of works must demonstrate that: (i) the uses 
affected by the prohibition in Section 1201(a)(1) are or are likely 
to be non-infringing;114 and (ii) the adverse impacts on these uses, 
i.e., the alleged harm, are or are likely to be substantial (as 
opposed to de minimis);115 and (iii) there is a causal connection 
between the prohibition on circumvention and adverse effects on 
those uses.116 In addition, the Register must examine the statutory 
factors set forth in Section 1201(a)(1)(C), as well as whether 
positive effects of the prohibition outweigh adverse effects claimed 
by proponents.117 
The Copyright Office explained that showing a particular use 
could be non-infringing is not enough.118 Rather, proponents must 
                                                                                                             
113 However, the Copyright Office has not clearly indicated whether the 
rebuttal of the exemption is subject to the preponderance of evidence standard as 
well. See Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, 
at 14. 
114 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added); 2015 Exemption, 
supra note 9, at 65,945 (emphasis added); Register’s Recommendation for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14–15 (emphasis added); Notice of Inquiry 
for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 (emphasis added). 
115 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000) (emphasis added); 2015 Exemption, 
supra note 9, at 65,945 (emphasis added); Register’s Recommendation for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 15–16 (emphasis added); Notice of Inquiry 
for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 (emphasis added). 
116 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,945 (emphasis added); Notice of 
Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 (emphasis added); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 16; see 
also Singh, supra note 12, at 557, 566 (emphasis added). 
117 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i)–(v) (2000) (emphasis added); 2015 
Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,945 (emphasis added); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 16 (emphasis 
added); Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 
(emphasis added). 
118 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
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demonstrate that the proposed use “is likely to qualify as non-
infringing under relevant law,”119 not merely that it might plausibly 
be deemed non-infringing.120 This means that a more stringent 
standard than the “rule of doubt” applies.121 
Further, the Copyright Office clarified that adverse effects on 
non-infringing uses of a particular class of copyrighted works must 
be substantial.122 The Copyright Office derived such a standard of 
harm from the language of the House Reports on the DMCA that 
the Copyright Office often refers to.123 Particularly, that Congress 
intended the rulemaking proceeding to “focus on distinct, 
verifiable, and measurable impacts”124 and “not [to] be based upon 
de minimis impacts.”125 Likewise, the Copyright Office continued, 
Congress instructed that the primary focus of the rulemaking 
should be on whether “a substantial diminution of that availability 
is actually occurring”126 (i.e., actual substantial harm) in the 
                                                                                                             
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 15. 
119 Id. (emphasis added). 
120 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
15; see also Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 
(citing Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, Section 1201 
Rulemaking: Fifth Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the 
Prohibition on Circumvention, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 7 (Oct. 2012)). 
121 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
15 (explaining that ‘there is no “rule of doubt” favoring an exemption when it is 
unclear that a particular use is a fair or otherwise non-infringing use’ (citing 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, Section 1201 Rulemaking: Fifth 
Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on 
Circumvention, at 7 (Oct. 2012))). 
122 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690. 
123 Id.; Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 36–37 (emphasis added); 
House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 6–7; see also Singh, supra note 12, 
at 547 n.140 (emphasis added) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 43,826 (July 27, 2010) that 
references the Commerce Comm. Report, H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 36 
(1998)). 
124 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 37 (emphasis added); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 15–16 
(emphasis added) (citing the Commerce Comm. Report at 37). 
125 Id. 
126 House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 6 (emphasis added); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 15–16 
(emphasis added) (citing the House Manager’s Report at 6). 
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marketplace for a particular class of works.127 The Copyright 
Office also emphasized that “mere inconveniences, or individual 
cases . . . do not rise to the level of a substantial adverse 
impact.”128 The Register’s reliance on this language caused 
problems in the past, particularly, with e-book and cellphone 
exemptions, which will be further discussed in Part III of this 
Article.129 
When, however, proponent’s claim relies on future rather than 
existing adverse impacts, the statute requires the proponent to 
demonstrate that such future impacts are “likely” to occur.130 But 
an exemption, the Copyright Office noted, can be based on the 
anticipated impact “only in extraordinary circumstances in which 
the evidence of likelihood of future adverse impact during that time 
                                                                                                             
127 Id. 
128 Id. (emphasis added). However, the Commerce Committee Report does 
not have such a “substantial diminution” language that is present in the House 
Manager’s Report. The former was prepared by the Commerce Committee, the 
very committee that proposed the rulemaking mechanism in the first place. The 
latter however was prepared by the Judiciary Committee after the DMCA bill 
was passed by the full House. For these reasons, the House Manager’s Report is 
seen by some as a less reliable source of congressional intent for the rulemaking 
framework, and therefore, more weight should be given to the Commerce 
Committee Report in determining rulemaking standards. See Commerce Comm. 
Report, supra note 6, at 37 (explaining that “primary goal of the rulemaking 
proceeding is to assess whether the prevalence of these technological 
protections, with respect to particular categories of copyrighted materials, is 
diminishing the ability of individuals to use these works in ways that are 
otherwise lawful”); Gray, supra note 15, at 783 (noting that some commentators 
do not consider the House Manager’s Report a reliable indicator of Congress’s 
intent for the rulemaking process); see also Herman & Gandy, supra note 72, at 
169 (noting that the House Manager’s Report was intended  to impose “a stricter 
ban than the one that resulted from Conference Committee and was passed by 
the full House and Senate”); Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards & the 
Future of the DMCA Anticircumvention Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 14 
(2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1114367 (characterizing the House Manager’s Report as “[o]ffering a 
slightly different interpretation” than the Commerce Committee Report). 
129 See infra p. 266 and notes 277–83. 
130 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 16; Notice of 
Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690. 
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period is highly specific, strong and persuasive.”131 Thus, the 
standard for an exemption based upon anticipated adverse impacts 
is even higher, and therefore, much harder to meet.132 Finally, 
those who seek an exemption must also show that “the TPM is the 
cause of the claimed adverse impact.”133 Accordingly, adverse 
impacts that are not “clearly attributable” to the TPM’s 
enforcement or come from other sources (e.g., price, quality of 
copies available on the market, safety regulations, etc.), are 
irrelevant and will not be considered within the scope of 
rulemaking.134 
In addition to the above requirements, the Register and the 
Librarian must also consider potential exemptions under the 
following statutory factors: (i) availability for use of copyrighted 
works; (ii) availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, 
preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) impact that the 
prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures 
applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of 
circumvention of technological measures on the market for or 
value of copyrighted works; and (v) such other factors as the 
Librarian considers appropriate.135 The fifth factor provides the 
                                                                                                             
131 House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 6 (emphasis added); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 16 
(emphasis added) (citing the House Manager’s Report at 6). 
As noted earlier, the Copyright Office’s reliance on the House Manager’s 
Report rather than on the Commerce Comm. Report might not be the best way 
to interpret congressional intent with respect to the rulemaking standards. See 
discussion and sources cited supra note 128. 
132 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690. 
133 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
16. 
134 See Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 37 (emphasis added); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 16 
(emphasis added) (citing the Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 37); see 
id. (providing a few examples of adverse effects stemming from other sources, 
including “marketplace trends, other technological developments, or changes in 
the roles of libraries, distributors or other intermediaries” (citing the House 
Manager’s Report at 6)). 
135 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i)–(v) (2000); 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, 
at 65,945; Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, 
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Librarian broad discretion.136 The Librarian has exercised this 
discretion only once in the 2010 Rulemaking, when he granted 
renewal of e-book exemption despite the Register’s 
recommendation to the opposite.137 Lastly, in addition to negative 
impacts, the Register and the Librarian may also consider the 
benefits that TPMs bring for “the overall creation and 
dissemination of works in the marketplace.”138 
Because the Register and the Librarian are required to make all 
the above determinations and weigh all the above factors, those 
who seek exemptions bear a heavy burden in proving their case 
before them. And thus, petitioners should carefully address above 
considerations in their proposals, which in turn, might require a 
lawyer’s assistance.139 
 
3. De Novo Review 
 
In addition to the above burdens and standards, there is also a 
de novo standard of review.140 This standard requires that each 
                                                                                                             
at 16. 
136 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v) (2000). 
137 Within the past seventeen years, the Librarian approved all the 
exemptions proposed by the Register of Copyrights, only once overriding the 
Register’s rejection to extend an exemption and granting renewal of the e-book 
exemption for the blind and visually impaired readers. See Gray, supra note 15, 
at 779–80; Singh, supra note 12, at 545 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,838–39 
(July 27, 2010)); see id. at 568 n.289–90 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,837–
38); see also 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,838–39. 
138 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,945; Register’s Recommendation 
for the Sixth Rulemaking, note 33, at 16. 
Again, the Copyright Office derived such a requirement from the House 
Manager’s Report. Neither Section 1201, nor Commerce Comm. Report, include 
such a language. See House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 6 (explaining 
that “the rulemaking proceedings should consider the positive as well as the 
adverse effects of these technologies on the availability of copyrighted 
materials”); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 
33, at 16 (citing House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 6); see also 
discussion supra note 128. 
139 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
140 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 37 (explaining that “[t]he 
rulemaking will be repeated” and “on each occasion, the assessment of adverse 
impacts on particular categories of works is to be determined de novo”); 
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triennial rulemaking is considered anew, which means that prior 
rulemakings do not have any precedential effect on the following 
rulemakings.141 Likewise, the Copyright Office noted, the fact that 
an exemption has been previously granted creates no precedent for 
the following rulemakings, meaning that a proponent must provide 
relevant evidence in every rulemaking to justify the continuation of 
the existing exemption.142 It is worth noting that this approach has 
created problems in the past, specifically, with e-book and 
cellphone unlocking exemptions, which will be further discussed 
in Part III of this Article.143 
In the most recent rulemaking, the Register noted that where 
proponents seek to renew an existing exemption, they may attempt 
to meet their burden by showing “the conditions that led to the 
adoption of the prior exemption continue to exist today (or that 
new conditions exist to justify the exemption).”144 The Register 
also explained that this burden could be satisfied by demonstrating 
that failure to renew such an exemption will “adversely impact 
users’ ability to make non-infringing uses of the class of works 
covered by the existing exemption.”145 Further, the Register 
acknowledged that in case of existing exemptions, the evidence 
“may be weak, incomplete or otherwise inadequate to support the 
                                                                                                             
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14 
(citing the Commerce Comm. Report at 37). 
141 Id.; see also Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 37 (clarifying 
that “[t]he regulatory prohibition is presumed to apply to any and all kinds of 
works, including those as to which a waiver of applicability was previously in 
effect, unless, and until, the [Librarian] makes a new determination that the 
adverse impact criteria have been met with respect to a particular class and 
therefore issues a new waiver”) (emphasis added); see also Notice of Inquiry for 
the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 (citing the Commerce Comm. 
Report, supra note 6,  at 37). 
142 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
14 (explaining that proponents cannot “simply rely on the fact that the Register 
has recommended an exemption in the past, but must instead produce relevant 
evidence in each rulemaking to justify the continuation of the exemption”). 
143 See infra pp. 263, 265 and notes 266, 273. 
144 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,495; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690. 
145 Id. 
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request for renewal”146 as, for instance, happened with the 
cellphone unlocking proposal in the 2012 Rulemaking 
proceeding.147 The Register nonetheless did not elaborate as to 
how such cases will be dealt with. Similarly to petitions for new 
exemptions, as soon as a proponent satisfies his burden of proof for 
re-adoption of an existing exemption, the burden shifts to the 
opponent to demonstrate that the exemption is no longer 
justified.148 
Such an approach might indicate the Register’s willingness to 
reconsider standard of proof for renewals to afford a presumption 
favoring proponents seeking re-adoption of existing exemptions, 
for instance, with respect to a class of works exempted or non-
infringing uses covered by exemption.149 While it is a step forward 
compared to the Register’s recommendations in 2010 and 2012,150 
the Register may be reluctant to lower the standard prescribed by 
Congress without an express congressional directive. 
Consequently, the Register suggested that Congress amend the 
rulemaking proceeding “to create a presumption in favor of 
renewal when there is no meaningful opposition to the 
continuation of an exemption.”151 Hopefully, the situation with 
renewals will be remedied should the Breaking Down Barriers to 
Innovation Act of 2015 or the like bill be passed.152 
 
 
                                                                                                             
146 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
4. 
147 See infra pp. 265–66 and notes 273, 280–82. 
148 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,495; Register’s Recommendation 
for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 14; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690. 
149 This does not necessarily mean that the standard should be the same for 
petitions that request modification or expansion of existing exemptions, as they 
may involve issues that go beyond the scope of previously granted exemptions. 
150 See infra pp. 263–66 and notes 266, 273, 276, 280. 
151 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
4; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also infra pp. 273–74 and 
notes 321–23. 
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4. Class of Works 
 
Pursuant to Section 1201(a)(1)(B), the Register must define “a 
particular class of works” for purposes of an exemption.153 Aside 
from the statutory language, Congress only indicated that this class 
must “be a narrow and focused subset of the broad categories of 
works”154 defined in Section 102 of the Copyright Act.155 Again, 
because Congress left little guidance on the issue, the Copyright 
Office has been trying for the past seventeen years to figure out an 
appropriate, workable standard in defining a class of works.156 At 
first, the Copyright Office started with a too rigid approach that 
was based solely on Section 102 categories and reference to a 
medium and/or access control TPM applied to the work.157 But 
since then, the Register has gradually leaned towards a more 
flexible interpretation by adding function- and user-based 
approaches.158 
                                                                                                             
153 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2000) (providing that an exemption adopted 
as part of the DMCA rulemaking must be defined based on “a particular class of 
works”); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, 
at 17; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690. 
154 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 38 (emphasis added); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 17 
(citing the Commerce Comm. Report at 38). 
155 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1990); Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, 
at 38; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690 
(citing the Commerce Comm. Report at 38). 
156 See infra notes 157–58. 
157 See U.S. Copyright Office, Recommendation of the Register of 
Copyrights in RM 2005-1: Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on 
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies 10 (2006) [hereinafter Register’s Recommendation for the Third 
Rulemaking] (noting that in the earlier rulemakings, the Register declined 
proposals to classify works by the type of user (e.g., libraries) or use (e.g., 
scholarly research)); see also Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 18 (citing Register’s Recommendation for the 
Third Rulemaking, at 10); Gray, supra note 15, at 766–68; Jackson, supra note 
21, at 529–30. 
158 It was the 2006 Rulemaking, when the Register for the first time in the 
rulemaking history defined a class of works by referring to “the particular type 
of use and/or user to which the exemption will apply.” See Jackson, supra note 
21; see also Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 
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Accordingly, in the 2015 Rulemaking, the Register noted that 
the list of Section 102 categories is “a starting point” for defining a 
“particular class.”159 The Register then may depart from these 
categories, being bound only by Congress’ general guidelines that 
such a class should not be too broad, as well as not too narrow. 160 
For this reason, the Copyright Office has recommended that 
proponents avoid seeking general (too broad) exemptions (e.g., for 
“all wireless devices,” “all computer tablets,” or “all motor 
vehicles”), as well as overly specific (too narrow) exemptions 
(e.g., for a “particular genres” of motion pictures, such as 
comedies, dramas, thrillers, or science fiction).161 Otherwise, it 
would be difficult to justify such an exemption.162 On the other 
hand, those petitions that focus on a specific category of devices 
(or a particular class of works), such as all-purpose tablet 
computers, or dedicated e-book readers, etc., are more likely to 
succeed.163 Therefore, those who want to get an exemption should 
adhere to the Congressional directive that a class of works must be 
neither overly broad, nor overly narrow to be exempted.164 
                                                                                                             
33, at 18 (acknowledging that “classifying a work solely by reference to the 
medium on which the work appears, or the access control measures applied to 
the work, would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent in directing the Register 
and Librarian to define a ‘particular class’ of works” (citing Register’s 
Recommendation for the Third Rulemaking, at 10); Notice of Inquiry for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691 n.11 (discussing the evolution of the 
Register’s approach in defining a class of works).  
159 House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 7; Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 18 (citing the 
House Manager’s Report at 7). 
160 House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 7 (explaining that “the 
category of ‘literary works’ embraces both prose creations such as journals, 
periodicals or books, and computer programs of all kinds,” but “these two 
categories of works, while both ‘literary works,’ do not constitute a single 
‘particular class’ for purposes” of the rulemaking. of this legislation); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 18 (citing the 
House Manager’s Report at 7); Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, 
supra note 9, at 55,690 (citing the House Manager’s Report at 7). 
161 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,690–91 
(citing the House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 7). 
162 Id. at 55,691. 
163 Id. at 55,690. 
164 In the 2015 Rulemaking, the Copyright Office declined to consider three 
 
36
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol11/iss3/5
2015] THE DMCA RULEMAKING MECHANISM 247 
In sum, when defining a class of works for a proposed 
exemption, the Register will refer to the following considerations: 
(i) the medium on which the works are distributed, (ii) a particular 
type of use and/or user which the exemption should cover, (iii) 
particular access control TPMs applied to them,165 or even (iv) the 
adverse effects that an exemption may have upon the “market for 
or value of copyrighted works.”166 Additionally, the Register will 
also refer to the specific record that is submitted.167 Therefore, in 
order to be granted an exemption, proponents should take the 
above criteria into account when preparing their submissions. 
 
B.  Administrative Procedure and Procedural Changes to the 2015 
Rulemaking 
 
As discussed above, the DMCA rulemaking constitutes a 
notice-and-comment proceeding, which calls for active 
participation of the general public and all interested parties.168 But 
because the rulemaking is overwhelmed with legal and evidentiary 
standards, it can be hard for non-lawyers to follow or participate in 
                                                                                                             
petitions because they sought to allow circumvention of “any and all TPMs that 
constituted digital rights management with respect to unspecified types of 
copyrighted works for the purpose of engaging in unidentified personal and/or 
consumer uses.” See Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, 
supra note 33, at 20 (emphasis added) (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 73,856, 73,859 (Dec. 
12, 2014)). 
165 Id. at 18; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 
55,691. 
166 This factor in defining a class of works mirrors the fourth statutory 
factor in Section 1201, and it is similar to one of the fair use factors in Section 
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2002); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); see also 
House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 7 (“Deciding the scope or 
boundaries of a ‘particular class’ of copyrighted works as to which the 
prohibition contained in section 1201(a)(1) has been shown to have had an 
adverse impact is an important issue to be determined during the rulemaking 
proceedings.”); Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 
55,691 (citing the House Manager’s Report, supra note 99, at 7); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 18–19. 
167 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
18. 
168 See sources cited supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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the process.169 Less and less individual users are submitting 
proposals to the Copyright Office.170 Even interested parties, such 
as copyright holders, advocacy groups, educational and research 
institutions, must often resort to attorneys and experts in the field 
to build a case for them.171 As a result, the notice and comment 
                                                                                                             
169 See sources cited supra note 19. 
170 In the 2000 Rulemaking, only about 15 out of 235 initial proposals for 
exemptions submitted to the Copyright Office were made by entities, the rest 
were from individual users. In the 2010 Rulemaking, the number of petitioners 
for proposed classes dropped to nineteen, less than a half were individual users. 
In the 2015 Rulemaking, out of twenty-seven petitioners less than a half were 
individual users, at least sixteen petitioners were various advocacy groups, 
educational institutions, and organizations representing copyright holders. See 
Public Comments, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on 
Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted 
Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/comments/ 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing a record of initial proposals submitted in 
1999–2000 during the First Rulemaking); see also Petitions for Proposed 
Exemptions, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing a record of initial proposals submitted in 2008 
during the Fourth Rulemaking); Petitions for Proposed Exemptions, Rulemaking 
on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Technological Measures 
that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing 
a record of initial proposals submitted in 2014 during the Sixth Rulemaking). 
171 For instance, in the 2015 Rulemaking, petitions for exemptions on 
behalf of interested parties were submitted either through or in collaboration 
with law school clinics and law professors specializing in intellectual property, 
or through an in-house counsel or even an outside counsel. See, e.g., Petition for 
Exemption by Coalition of Medical Device Researchers, Docket No. 2014–07, 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, available at http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/ 
petitions/Berkman_Center_1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf (submitted by 
Cyberlaw Clinic, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School); 
Petition for Exemption by Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc., Docket 
No. 2014–07, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, available at http://copyright.gov/ 
1201/2014/petitions/Institute_of_Scrap_Recycling_Industries_2_1201_Initial_S
ubmission_2014.pdf (submitted by Juelsgaard Intellectual Property & 
Innovation Clinic, Stanford Law School); Petition for Exemption by Competitive 
Carriers Association, Docket No. 2014–07, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, available 
at http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/Competitive_Carriers_Association 
_1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf (submitted by Association’s General 
Counsel); Petition for Exemption by Library Copyright Alliance, Docket No. 
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process, which was intended to have broad public participation, is 
now dominated by legal experts.172 
To understand the challenges of the rulemaking process, it is 
therefore important to examine the established administrative 
procedure employed by the Copyright Office, as well as its recent 
modifications.173 Generally, the rulemaking proceeding has five 
phases: (i) petition phase (proponents submit proposals for 
exemptions); (ii) public comment phase (proponents, opponents, 
and other interested parties submit their comments on proposals); 
(iii) public hearings phase (parties present their arguments in the 
round tables held by the Copyright Office); (iv) post-hearing 
questions phase (parties respond to the Copyright Office’s follow-
up questions); (v) recommendation and final rule phase (the 
Register, upon the input by the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (“NTIA”), provides a recommendation 
to the Librarian, who then issues a final rule announcing 
exemptions for a succeeding three-year period).174 The Copyright 
Office provides a full administrative record for each rulemaking 
proceeding, including the Register’s notices, submitted proposals 
and comments, transcripts of public hearings, post-hearing 
questions and answers, the Register’s recommendation, and the 
Librarian’s decision.175 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2014–07, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Nov. 3, 2014), available at 
http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/Library_Copyright_Alliance_1201_Init
ial_Submission_2014.pdf (submitted by an outside counsel, Jonathan Band, 
specializing in technology law and policy). 
172 See supra note 171; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
173 See generally Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright 
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,398 
(proposed Sept. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 
Notice of Inquiry for the Fifth Rulemaking]; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691. 
174 Notice of Inquiry for the Fifth Rulemaking, supra note 173, at 60,404–
05 (emphasis added). 
175 Section 1201 Rulemakings, supra note 9 (providing a full administrative 
record for all rulemakings). 
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1. Petition Phase 
 
The Copyright Office initiates the rulemaking process by 
issuing a Notice of Inquiry inviting the public to submit their 
proposals for exemptions.176 In the previous rulemakings, the 
Copyright Office required proponents to present their entire case 
with complete legal and evidentiary support in their initial 
submission of proposals.177 The Copyright Office did not offer 
specific guidance as to the format and essential elements of such 
proposals.178 It did, however permit untimely submissions of 
proposals in cases of “exceptional or unforeseen circumstances.”179 
Under the modified procedure, proponents now only need to 
submit a brief summary (basic information) of their proposal180—
submission of a complete legally and factually supported proposal 
is no longer required in the petition phase.181 Proponents must, 
however, concisely describe each of the essential elements of the 
proposed exemption, such as a class or category of copyrighted 
works sought to be accessed, basic nature of TPMs applied to these 
works, specific non-infringing uses of copyrighted works sought to 
be facilitated by circumvention, current or probable adverse effects 
on proposed non-infringing uses, etc.182 
                                                                                                             
176 Notice of Inquiry for the Fifth Rulemaking, supra note 173, at 60,398 
(initiating the petition phase of the 2012 Rulemaking); Notice of Inquiry for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,687, 55,691 (initiating the petition phase 
of the 2015 Rulemaking); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 19. 
177 Notice of Inquiry for the Fifth Rulemaking, supra note 173, at 60,403; 
Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691 (emphasis 
added) (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 60,403 (Sept. 29, 2011)); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 19. 
178 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
19. 
179 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691 
(citing 76 Fed. Reg. 60,404). 
180 Id. at 55,692–93; Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, 
supra note 33, at 19. 
181 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,692; 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 19–20. 
182 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,692–93; 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 19. 
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The Copyright Office also provided more guidance on 
submission of initial proposals, including: (i) recommended format 
and contents of proposals, as well as essential elements to be 
included in them;183 and (ii) supplied template petition forms.184 
Thus, because the modified procedure and Copyright Office’s 
guidance significantly facilitate initial submissions, the Copyright 
Office decided to not administer a specific procedure for untimely 
petitions,185 although the Office did reserve its right to address 
unanticipated situations that may arise in the submission 
process.186 
The Copyright Office also now requires that petitions address a 
single proposed exemption.187 But petitioners may submit multiple 
proposals.188 The Copyright Office made this modification because 
proponents in previous rulemakings sometimes combined their 
proposals for different classes of works into a single submission.189 
This modification made such submissions both difficult and time-
consuming for other participants and the general public to follow, 
and for the Copyright Office to determine which arguments and 
evidence supported which proposed exemption.190 This separation 
of submissions by a proposed class of works was meant to ensure 
more focused replies and an overall clearer rulemaking record. It 
worked quite well for the 2015 Rulemaking.191 
                                                                                                             
183 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,692–93 
(explaining specific requirements for format and contents of initial submissions). 
184 Id. at 55,692 (providing a link to the templates at 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 20. 
185 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,692. 
186 Id. In the 2015 Rulemaking, the Office allowed late filings by 510(k) 
Coalition in the public comment phase. See Late Filed Comments, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/late-filings (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015) (providing a record of late filed comments). 
187 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,692. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. In the 2015 Rulemaking, the Copyright Office grouped the proposed 
exemptions into twenty-seven proposed classes of works; overlapping proposals 
were merged into a single combined proposed class; and individual proposals, 
which covered multiple proposed uses, got subdivided into multiple classes. See 
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2. Public Comment Phase 
 
Upon receipt of initial submissions with proposed exemptions, 
the Copyright Office studies submissions, posts them on its 
website, and then issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that 
outlines the proposals and invites interested parties to submit 
comments.192 In the previous rulemakings, there were two rounds 
of comments.193 During the first round, all commentators 
submitted their comments both in support of and in opposition to 
proposals.194 Then, all commentators submitted their replies both 
in support of and in opposition to the proposed exemptions.195 This 
practice made it difficult for commentators to follow the points 
made by their opponents.196 
According to the revised procedure, the Copyright Office 
divided the public comment phase into three rounds of 
comments.197 The first round of comments is now limited to 
submissions by proponents and supporters of proposed 
exemptions, plus any neutral parties who simply want to share 
relevant information on a particular proposal.198 Other than 
                                                                                                             
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 20; see 
also Section 1201 Rulemakings, supra note 9 (providing a full administrative 
record for the Sixth Rulemaking). 
192 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691; see 
also Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,866 (Dec. 20, 2011) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (initiating the public comment phase); 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,856, 73,857 (Dec. 12, 2014) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed 2015 
Rulemaking] (initiating the public comment phase of the 2015 Rulemaking and 
providing guidance for comment submissions). 
193 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691. 
194 Id. (requesting additional factual information to assist the Office in 
determining whether proposed classes are warranted for exemption (citing 76 
Fed. Reg. 78,866, 78,868 (Dec. 20, 2011)). 
195 Id. 
196 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
21. 
197 Id.; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693. 
198 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
21; Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693. 
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responding to their opponents, proponents should submit their 
entire case (including documentary evidence and multimedia 
presentations) during this round of public comments.199 The 
second round of comments is limited to submissions by opponents 
of proposed exemptions, who may also include some documentary 
evidence and multimedia presentations in support of their 
position.200 A third round of comments is limited to proponents 
and supporters of particular proposals and neutral parties.201 But 
their comments may only address points raised earlier, i.e., no new 
issues can be introduced at this point.202 
Similar to the petition phase, all commentators must provide 
separate submissions for each proposed exemption at each round 
of public comments.203 Although, as the Copyright Office noted 
itself, this practice might sometimes be a bit repetitive, creating 
separate records for each proposal would ensure a better track by a 
particular class of works,204 and for the 2015 Rulemaking it did.205 
Again, the Copyright Office has provided more guidance on 
submission of comments than it did in the previous rulemakings. 
Specifically, the Copyright Office: (i) recommended specific areas 
                                                                                                             
199 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693 
(noting that proponents may submit multimedia presentations of the proposed 
non-infringing use, adverse effects, and/or other relevant material to prove their 
case). 
200 Id. In the 2015 Rulemaking, the Office received nearly 40,000 
comments in total. Although the vast majority of them consisted of short 
statements without substantial legal or evidentiary support, a number of the 
longer submissions did include supporting evidence, such as multimedia files. 
See Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 21–
22. 
201 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693; 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 21–22. 
202 Id. 
203 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
21 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 73,856, 73,857). 
204 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,692–93. 
205 The 2015 Rulemaking provided a clear and convenient tracking record 
for all classes of works. See Section 1201 Rulemakings, supra note 9 (providing 
a full administrative record for the Sixth Rulemaking); see also Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 21 (noting that as 
the 2015 proceeding progressed, the Copyright Office did in fact find such a 
refinement to be helpful). 
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of legal and factual interest concerning each proposed class, types 
of evidence to be submitted with comments, format and content for 
submissions;206 (ii) supplied short- and long-form comment 
templates;207 (iii) grouped similar or overlapping proposed 
exemptions by a class of works, so that commentators could refer 
to these proposed classes in their submissions;208 (iv) repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of supporting evidence to the 
process.209 
 
3. Public Hearings Phase 
 
After the public comment period closes, the Copyright Office 
issues a Notice of Public Hearings that provides guidelines for the 
hearings and invites the public to submit requests.210 The 
Copyright Office then conducts public hearings to further discuss 
and explore proposed exemptions.211 Hearings are generally 
organized by subject matter and proposed classes of works.212 
                                                                                                             
206 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
21 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 73,856, 73,857); see also Notice of Proposed 2015 
Rulemaking, supra note 192, at 73,857 (providing guidance for the public 
comment phase of the 2015 rulemaking). 
207 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
20–21 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 73,856, 73,858); see also Notice of Proposed 2015 
Rulemaking, supra note 192, at 73,858 (providing guidance for short- and long 
form comments). 
208 Notice of Proposed 2015 Rulemaking, supra note 192, at 73,859–72 
(grouping proposed exemptions set forth in the forty-four petitions into twenty-
seven proposed classes). 
209 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693. 
210 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 15,327 (Mar. 15, 2012) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Notice of Public Hearings for 
the Fifth Rulemaking] (initiating the public hearings phase and providing 
guidance on the process); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 
19,255 (Apr. 10, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Notice 
of Public Hearings for the Sixth Rulemaking] (initiating the public hearings 
phase and providing guidance on the process). 
211 Id. 
212 Notice of Public Hearings for the Fifth Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 
15,328. 
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Parties that are willing to testify at a hearing must submit a request 
to the Copyright Office.213 In the 2012 Rulemaking, there was a 
separate “technology hearing,” where witnesses demonstrated 
technologies pertinent to specific proposals.214 The following 
additional hearings were limited to the testimony of witnesses, 
including presentations of facts and legal arguments, and responses 
to the follow-up questions from the Copyright Office’s and 
NTIA’s staff.215 
Under the modified procedure, there will be no separate 
technology hearing.216 Rather, all hearings will focus on legal and 
factual issues and demonstrative evidence of technologies pertinent 
to specific proposals.217 In addition, anyone desiring to testify on 
more than one proposed class is required to submit a separate form 
for each request to testify.218 Before the hearings, the Copyright 
Office issues a Hearings Agenda with information about the time 
and place of the hearings, witnesses to be heard, and classes of 
works to be discussed.219 
                                                                                                             
213 Id.; Notice of Public Hearings for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 210, 
at 19,255. 
214 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693 
(citing 77 Fed. Reg. 15,328 (Mar. 15, 2012)); see also id. at 55,691 n.13 (noting 
that it was the first time the Copyright Office held a hearing that specifically 
focused on technologies pertinent to proposed exemptions). 
215 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693 
(citing 77 Fed. Reg. 15,328). 
216 Notice of Public Hearings for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 
19,255. 
217 Id. at 19,255–56 (stressing that factual information is critical to the 
process and encouraging witnesses to provide real-world examples in support of 
their position); see also Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, 
supra note 33, at 22 (providing an overview of the public hearing phase in the 
2015 Rulemaking, specifically, that the Copyright Office held seven days of 
hearings in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., heard testimony from sixty-
three witnesses, and received additional multimedia evidence at the hearings). 
218 Notice of Public Hearings for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 
19,255. 
219 See generally Final Agenda for the Sixth Triennial 1201 Rulemaking 
Hearings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (May 7, 2015), http://copyright.gov/ 
1201/2015/Final_1201_hearing_agenda_20150507.pdf (providing information 
about the time and place of the hearings, their participants and proposed classes 
for discussion); see also Public Hearings Transcripts on Exemptions to the 
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4. Post-Hearing Questions Phase 
 
Following the hearings, the Copyright Office sends specific 
follow-up questions to the witnesses, who respond to these 
questions with additional comments.220 This phase is designed to 
help the Copyright Office clarify any unresolved issues concerning 
proposed exemptions.221 In the 2015 proceeding, the Copyright 
Office stated that it may rely on this process more than in the 
previous rulemakings,222 particularly to give proponents and 
opponents a final opportunity to provide any missing information 
that might be material to specific exemptions.223 Similar to the 
public hearings, post-hearing questions and answers are 
conveniently grouped by proposed classes of works.224 No 
significant changes were made to this phase of the proceeding. 
 
                                                                                                             
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/1201/ 
2015/hearing-transcripts (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (the Copyright Office’s 
Public Hearings held from May 19 to 29, 2015); Hearing Exhibits, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/hearing-exhibits (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing exhibits submitted by parties who testified at 
the Public Hearings held from May 19 to 29, 2015). 
220 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693–94; 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 22; see 
generally Post-Hearing Questions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/post-hearing (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) 
(providing a record of the Office’s follow-up questions to the witnesses who 
testified at the hearings); Post-Hearing Answers, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/post-hearing/answers (last visited Nov. 17, 
2015) (providing a record of the post-hearing answers from the witnesses who 
testified at the hearings). 
221 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693–94; 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 22. 
222 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693 
(noting that requests for responses to follow-up questions “will be in the form of 
a letter from the Copyright Office and will be addressed to individual parties 
involved in the proposal” regarding which the Office seeks additional 
information). 
223 Id. 
224 See generally Post-Hearing Questions, supra note 220; Post-Hearing 
Answers, supra note 220. 
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5. Recommendation and Final Rule Phase 
 
Finally, the Register reviews the resulting administrative 
record, consults with the NTIA’s Assistant Secretary,225 and 
prepares a recommendation to the Librarian on each proposed class 
of works to be exempted for a succeeding three-year period.226 
Upon consideration of the Register’s recommendation, the 
Librarian adopts a final rule and publishes his decision on 
proposed exemptions in the Federal Register.227 Note that if there 
is any delay in the rulemaking process, as happened in the 2010 
Rulemaking, the Librarian of Congress may publish an Interim 
Rule to extend the existing exemptions.228 The final phase of the 
rulemaking proceeding is also without change. 
 
6. Summary of Procedural Changes 
 
In sum, the key differences between the former and modified 
procedure include: (i) petitioners are no longer required to submit 
their entire case at the initial petition phase, rather a brief summary 
                                                                                                             
225 In the 2015 Rulemaking, NTIA was represented at the public hearings, 
provided procedural and substantive input throughout the rulemaking 
proceedings, and formally communicated its position on each of the proposed 
exemptions in its letter to the Register. See Register’s Recommendation for the 
Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 23; see generally Letter from Lawrence E. 
Strickling, Assistant Sec’y for Commc’ns & Info., U.S. Department of 
Commerce, to Maria Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright 
Office, at 1 (Sept. 18, 2015), available at http://copyright.gov/ 
1201/2015/2015_NTIA_Letter.pdf. 
226 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,693 
(citing 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260 (Oct. 26, 2012)). 
227 Id. at 55,691, 55,693–94 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260); see also 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 5–7 
(providing a summary of Register’s recommendations); 2015 Exemption, supra 
note 9, at 65,944 (providing the Librarian’s final decision on proposed 
exemptions). 
228 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,138 (Oct. 27, 2009) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. at 201) (extending, on an interim basis, the existing 
classes of works); Singh, supra note 12, at 546 (referring to the Exemption to 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, Interim Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,138 (Oct. 27, 2009)). 
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of their proposal is sufficient at this phase of proceeding; (ii) a 
more structured public comment process is implemented—instead 
of two rounds of public comments (where both proponents and 
opponents submitted their comments) there are now three rounds 
(the first is limited to proponents’ comments, the second—to 
opponents’ comments, and the third—to reply comments); (iii) 
separate petitions and comments must be submitted for each 
proposed exemption to ensure an easier tracking of proposals by a 
specific class of works and overall a clearer administrative record; 
(iv) legal arguments for proposed classes of works and 
technologies involved in these works must be presented and 
demonstrated within the same hearing; and (v) the Copyright 
Office provides more detailed and specific guidance in the petition 
and public comment phases to help participants better navigate 
through the process. 
As the Copyright Office hoped, the above procedural changes 
provided an opportunity for all participants of the 2015 
Rulemaking to better coordinate their submissions and more 
effectively participate in the process.229 The Copyright Office 
believes that these changes will help to further enhance a better 
understanding of the rulemaking process, including its legal and 
evidentiary requirements, by the layman members of the public.230 
Finally, the Copyright Office expects that in the future, these 
procedural changes will significantly reduce at least some 
administrative burdens on the participants, as well as the Copyright 
Office itself.231 
Although some of these changes have turned out to be a good 
practice,232 they are still insufficient to make the rulemaking 
proceeding effective and comprehensive overall.233 However, if 
this revised procedure continues to make the process more 
comprehensive and easier to follow, it will at least resolve some of 
the problems with the DMCA rulemaking. What matters is that the 
very decision to modify the procedure along with the Copyright 
                                                                                                             
229 Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,691–92. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 55,692. 
232 See supra notes 197, 206-08 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 19–20, 170–72 and accompanying text. 
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Office’s expressed expectations are indicative of the Register’s 
awareness and concern over efficiency of the rulemaking 
proceeding.234 
 
III. PRIOR RULEMAKINGS 
 
If the past seventeen years have shown anything, it is that the 
DMCA rulemaking mechanism plays an important role in the U.S. 
copyright system.235 As was emphasized in Part I, this mechanism 
is unique; only one other country in the world has such a flexible 
scheme236 that allows a government agency (the Library of 
Congress) to adjust the law as technology and the marketplace 
evolve and dictate a different outcome for the DMCA 
provisions.237 One might say that other countries did not 
implement a similar mechanism because they originally provided 
more exemptions than the U.S.,238 or adopted narrower anti-
circumvention provisions.239 Whether or not this is the case, it does 
                                                                                                             
234 See Rachael Stelly, The Copyright Office Preps For a New Section 1201 
Rulemaking, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/120814-copyright-office-
preps-new-section-1201-rulemaking (noting that the Copyright Office seems “to 
be cognizant of the process’s issues and, this year, has made changes to the 
administrative procedures”). 
235 The Register herself recently noted that the DMCA scheme plays “a 
critical role in the development of secure platforms for the digital distribution of 
copyrighted works.” See Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, 
supra note 33, at 2. 
236 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
237 Commerce Comm. Report, supra note 6, at 36; Singh, supra note 12, at 
529 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998)). 
238 For example, the U.K. has twenty-five exemptions as opposed to the 
U.S. that has only seven. See Guidance on the technological protection 
measures (TPMs) complaints process, INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE UK 1 (Nov. 
3, 2014) [hereinafter Guidance on the U.K. Complaint Process], 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technological-protection-
measures-tpms-complaints-process. 
239 Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 58, at 15 (discussing narrow anti-
circumvention provisions enacted in the EU countries); see also Copyright and 
Related Rights Regulations 2003, S.I. 2003/2498/EC, sec. 296ZF(3) (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2498/regulation/24/made (enacting 
anti-circumvention provisions that do not cover instances where TPMs are used 
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not change the fact that new technologies evolve and marketplace 
realities change faster than ever before. This necessitates a flexible 
scheme—one which allows the law to catch-up with such changes. 
 
A.  Positive Trends 
 
Past rulemakings have demonstrated that although the DMCA 
mechanism has certain drawbacks, it is not without advances 
towards balancing between copyright and digital technologies.240 If 
not for the DMCA rulemaking mechanism, one wonders what the 
consumer and market landscape would look like today.241 Had it 
not been for this mechanism, we would not even have the small 
number of exemptions that the public has enjoyed since 1998. 
Users would not be permitted to unlock their cellphones, computer 
tablets, and smartwatches to switch wireless carriers,242 or to 
                                                                                                             
to prevent or limit uses, which are outside the scope of the copyright); see 
additionally Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright (consolidated text as of 
January 1, 2007), art. 95(1) (Hung.), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
details.jsp?id=11840 (enacting anti-circumvention provisions, which prescribe 
that “the legal consequences of the infringement of copyright” apply to the 
circumvention of TPMs “designed to provide protection for copyright;” thus, 
limiting application of these provisions to the acts of circumvention that infringe 
the copyright and to TPMs that are designed to prevent such infringements). But 
see sources cited supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
240 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
1 (emphasizing the key role of the triennial rulemaking in the DMCA scheme in 
achieving a healthy balance between the copyrights and digital technologies). 
241 Kravets, supra note 43 (concluding that despite certain problems and 
drawbacks in the DMCA scheme, it is “impossible to gauge what the internet 
landscape would look like today had it not been for the DMCA”). 
242 The cellphone unlocking exemption was originally granted in 2006; 
renewed and expanded in 2010; partially renewed (for ninety days) in 2012; 
fully renewed in the 2010 version in 2014; and again granted in 2015 (also 
covering computer tablets, smartwatches and fitness devices). See 2006 
Exemption, supra note 13, at 68,480; 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,839; 
2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 65,278 (granting a limited unlocking 
exemption that covered only cellphones acquired within the ninety days after the 
Librarian’s decision was issued, i.e., before January 24, 2013); Unlocking 
Consumer Choice & Wireless Competition Act, supra note 23 (substituting the 
broader version of the 2010 cellphone unlocking exemption for the limited 2012 
version); 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,962–63. 
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jailbreak their phones, tablets, and smart TVs to remove original 
software apps and install apps from sources of their choice.243 Nor 
would they be permitted to use alternative feedstock in 3D printers 
protected by TPMs,244 or to inspect and modify protected software 
in their cars and other vehicles.245 But more importantly, users are 
allowed to circumvent TPMs to have a security testing of their 
motor vehicles and medical devices (e.g., body implants).246 
Likewise, if not for the e-book exemption granted by the 
Librarian,247 the e-book library for millions of blind, visually 
impaired, and print-disabled readers248 would still be limited to a 
small number of books that have text-to-speech (“TTS”) 
                                                                                                             
243 The cellphone jailbreaking exemption was originally granted in 2010; 
renewed in 2012; and again renewed in 2015 (also covering computer tablets 
and smart TVs). See 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,839; 2012 
Exemption, supra note 13, at 65,278–79; 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 
65,963. 
244 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,963 (granting for the first time a 
“3D printer” exemption that permits the use alternative feedstock in 3D printers, 
which employ microchip-reliant TPMs to limit the use of feedstock). 
245 Id. (granting for the first time a “car tinkering” exemption that permits 
users to circumvent TPMs in personal cars, commercial vehicles and agricultural 
machinery for purposes of diagnosis, repair and modification of these vehicles 
and equipment; although delaying its implementation for one year); see also 
EFF Wins Petition to Inspect and Modify Car Software, supra note 47 
(discussing the importance of this exemption). 
246 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,963 (granting for the first time an 
exemption that permits users to circumvent TPMs in voting machines, 
motorized land vehicles, and medical devices designed for implantation in 
patients or a corresponding personal monitoring systems; although delaying its 
implementation for one year). 
247 The e-book exemption was originally granted in 2003; renewed in 2006; 
renewed again in 2010 despite the Register’s recommendation to the opposite; 
and renewed again in 2012 and 2015. See 2003 Exemption, supra note 13, at 
62,018; 2006 Exemption, supra note 13, at 68,480; 2010 Exemption, supra note 
13, at 43,839; 2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 65,278; 2015 Exemption, 
supra note 9, at 65,962. 
248 See Reply Comment on Proposed Class 9: Literary Works Distributed 
Electronically—Assistive Technologies, AM. FOUND. FOR THE BLIND (AFB) 3 
(2015), available at http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/reply-comments-050115/ 
class%209/ReplyComments_LongForm_AFBEtAl_Class09.pdf (noting that there 
are over 100,000 visually impaired students in the U.S.). 
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capabilities,249 depriving them of an opportunity to enjoy an 
endless number of e-books available to readers without visual 
impairments.  
Congress believes that, despite all the criticism, the DMCA and 
the triennial rulemaking have proven to be a success for a number 
of reasons.250 First, not only has the rulemaking proceeding 
resulted in dozens of exemptions in addition to the statutory ones 
provided,251 but it has also afforded flexibility to the DMCA 
scheme as was intended by Congress in 1998.252 Second, the 
Copyright Office has become more flexible in its interpretations of 
the legal and evidentiary standards.253 Not only has the Copyright 
Office started to apply fair use analysis when considering proposed 
exemptions, but it has also broadened its interpretations to include 
function- and user-based approaches in defining a class of 
works.254 Third, the overall process has become more structured: 
both the legal and evidentiary standards, as well as the 
administrative procedure, have become considerably certain and 
consistent, and with the recent procedural changes, the process 
may become more user-friendly. Furthermore, because the 
                                                                                                             
249 Text-to-speech capability is also called a read-aloud function. 
250 Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers Jr., Ranking Member, Comm. on Judiciary) (“Chapter 12 maintains the 
necessary balance between strong copyright protection measures and a 
consumer driven marketplace for legitimate uses of copyrighted works.”); see 
also id. at 3–4 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member, Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet) (“[E]nactment of the DMCA 
has led to a long period of innovation and benefits for consumers.”). 
251 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)–(j) (2000); Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 
4 (statement of Rep. John Conyers Jr., Ranking Member, Comm. on Judiciary); 
see also id. at 2–3 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member, 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet) (acknowledging 
flexibility of the DMCA mechanism and its crucial role for innovation); see also 
sources cited supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
252 See sources cited supra notes 6–7, 83, 85 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 105, 158 and accompanying text; see also Gray, supra 
note 15, at 792; see additionally Jackson, supra note 21, at 541–42 (discussing 
the 2009 exemption that permitted “audiovisual works used for the purpose of 
university learning, documentary filmmaking, and noncommercial video 
production” considering “both the user and that user's intention with the work,” 
which allowed exemptions to begin “to truly protect fair uses for the first time”). 
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triennial rulemaking has such broad and important real-world 
implications on people’s daily lives,255 the public awareness of the 
rulemaking has significantly grown within the last five years (in 
most part, due to the cellphone unlocking debate).256 Finally, 
despite the premise that the Register’s recommendations are 
generally crucial for the final outcome of the rulemaking, the 
Librarian has demonstrated a positive trend of his own—
specifically, by exercising discretion and deviating from the 
Register’s recommendations where an exemption is socially 
beneficial.257 
 
B.  Areas for Improvement 
 
While the DMCA has enjoyed some success, several 
fundamental problems have also surfaced. Congress has partially 
addressed some of them (e.g., cellphone unlocking issue),258 but 
other problems continue to exist and affect the rulemaking 
mechanism. The major problem is the standard of review for 
renewals of existing exemptions. 
 
1. Standard of Review for Renewals 
 
As was discussed in Part II, the de novo standard of review 
compels proponents seeking renewals to prove anew that 
continuation of an exemption is still justified.259 Such a showing is 
required despite that the need for non-infringing uses of exempted 
classes of works has not significantly changed over time and there 
is no meaningful opposition to renewal.260 This has been the case 
                                                                                                             
255 See sources cited supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
256 See infra pp. 269–70 and notes 305–07; see also Section 1201 Hearing, 
supra note 13, at 43 (testimony of McSherry, Intell. Prop. Dir., EFF) 
(“Americans got a sense of the problem when they discovered, to their surprise, 
that merely unlocking their phones to go to a different carrier might be illegal.”). 
257 See sources cited supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
258 See infra pp. 270–71 and notes 310–13. 
259 See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
260 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
4 (noting that de novo standard requires proponents for renewals of existing 
exemptions to submit evidence every three years anew, though proponents have 
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with a number of exemptions, including but not limited to: 
cellphone unlocking and jailbreaking, e-books,261 film studies,262 
and video remixes exemptions.263 
Because of the de novo standard, prior rulemakings do not have 
precedential effect on future exemptions.264 Thus, proponents for 
renewal cannot simply rely on their previous submissions, but 
rather must support their case with new evidence in each 
proceeding.265 For instance, in the 2010 Rulemaking, the Register 
recommended not to renew the e-book exemption because 
petitioners based their proposal for renewal on their previous 
submissions in the 2003 and 2006 Rulemakings, although the 
situation with e-books had not significantly changed since 2002.266 
Moreover, the e-book exemption is an example of how unfairly the 
de novo standard burdens proponents seeking renewals of 
previously granted exemptions.267 Thus, even though the e-book 
exemption has been repeatedly granted by the Librarian since the 
2003 Rulemaking,268 and there has been no substantial opposition 
to its renewal,269 visually impaired people must continue to fight 
                                                                                                             
made a strong case in the previous rulemakings and there is no meaningful 
opposition to continuation of existing exemptions). 
261 See sources cited supra notes 242–43, 247 and accompanying text. 
262 The “film studies” exemption evolved and expanded overtime. 
Originally granted in 2006, it got renewed and expanded in 2010 and 2012, and 
then renewed and merged with the remix video exemption in 2015. See 2003 
Exemption, supra note 13, at 62,018; 2006 Exemption, supra note 13, at 68,480; 
2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,839; 2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 
65,278–79; 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,962. 
263 The “video remixes” exemption was originally granted in 2010, renewed 
and expanded in 2012, and again in 2015 merging with the film studies 
exemption. See 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,839; 2012 Exemption, 
supra note 13, at 65,279; 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,962. 
264 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
4. 
265 Id. 
266 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,837–39; Gray, supra note 15, at 
783–84. 
267 Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 4–6 (testimony of Mark Richert, 
Dir. of Pub. Policy, Am. Found. for the Blind) (summarizing the rulemaking 
experience with e-book exemption). 
268 See sources cited supra note 247. 
269 Register’s Recommendation for the Fourth Rulemaking, supra note 108, 
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for their right to access e-books in every single rulemaking.270 And 
this is despite the fact that statutory and established case law treats 
uses covered by the e-book exemption as fair use,271 and 
international obligations of the United States require facilitation of 
accessibility to published works for persons who are blind, visually 
impaired, or otherwise print disabled.272 Similarly, the new 
                                                                                                             
at 251 (noting that except for few concerns expressed by Joint Creators, there 
was no opposition to renewing the exemption); Recommendation of the Register 
of Copyrights, Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding to 
Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention 19 (Oct. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter Register’s Recommendation for the Fifth Rulemaking] (noting that 
with an exception for a few concerns by Joint Creators, there was no opposition 
to renewing the exemption); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 133 (noting that except for a few concerns 
expressed by the American Publishers Association, there was no opposition to 
renewing the 2012 e-book exemption). 
270 See supra notes 260–61; see also It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra note 
20 (arguing that “there is something fundamentally wrong with a process that 
makes people who are blind or visually impaired have to, over and over again, 
beg for protection from potentially significant civil and criminal penalties just 
for finding a way to access books they have a right to read” (citing Mark 
Richert, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Am. Found. for the Blind)). 
271 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); 17 U.S.C. § 121 (1997) (“the Chafee 
Amendment”) (providing that “it is not an infringement of copyright for an 
authorized entity to reproduce or to distribute copies . . . of a previously 
published, nondramatic literary work if such copies . . . are reproduced or 
distributed in specialized formats exclusively for use by blind or other persons 
with disabilities.”); see also Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 103 
(2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “fair use allows the Libraries to provide full digital 
access to copyrighted works to their print-disabled patrons”); Register’s 
Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 133 
(acknowledging that the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
Chafee Amendment, and the HathiTrust decision support the proponent’s “claim 
that converting e-books into accessible formats is a non-infringing fair use”). 
However, currently neither the Chafee Amendment, nor the fair use provisions 
can protect visually impaired people against the DMCA liability if they 
circumvent TPMs that prevent access to the copyrighted material, which they 
are authorized to copy. 
272 On October 2, 2013, the U.S. signed the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or 
Otherwise Print Disabled, but has not ratified it yet, because there is still some 
uncertainty whether the U.S. copyright laws comply with the treaty’s provisions. 
The treaty promises to amend the copyright law to provide 
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evidence requirement caused troubles in the 2012 Rulemaking. 
The Register recommended not renewing the broad 2010 cellphone 
unlocking exemption because proponents failed to make their case, 
relying on the 2010 Rulemaking rather than supplying new 
evidence.273 
Furthermore, the standard of proof is the same for all petitions, 
either seeking new exemptions or renewals of the existing ones.274 
This creates certain challenges in proving actual, let alone 
substantial, harm in case of renewals.275 This issue surfaced in the 
2010 Rulemaking with the e-book exemption and in 2012 with the 
cellphone exemption. Thus, one of the reasons the Register 
recommended not renewing the e-book exemption in 2010 was 
petitioners’ failure to provide evidence of actual substantial 
harm.276 Specifically, the access control prohibition adversely 
                                                                                                             
limitations/exceptions that allow: (i) reproduction of works, by an authorized 
entity, for the purpose of converting them into accessible format copies 
exclusively for the use of beneficiary persons; (ii) distribution of accessible 
format copies exclusively to beneficiary persons; (iii) export of accessible 
format copies of works, in order to make them available to a beneficiary person 
in another country; and (iv) import of accessible format copies of works 
produced in another country, in order to make them available domestically. See 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are 
Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, art. 4, June 27, 2013, 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=301016; see also Ratification of the Marrakesh 
Treaty Legislative Imperative, AM. COUNCIL OF THE BLIND, http://acb.org/ 
LIMarrakesh (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); The Register’s Perspective On 
Copyright Review, supra note 30, at 20–21 (stating that the Copyright Office 
fully supports swift ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty, which would permit 
American people with visual impairments to enjoy accessible format copies of 
works from around the world); Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth 
Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 136 (acknowledging that the e-book exemption is 
consistent with the U.S. obligations under the Marrakesh Treaty). 
273 See 2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 65,260, 65,265–66, 65,278; 
Gray, supra note 15, at 778–79. 
274 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000); 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 
65,945–46; Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 
33, at 14–16. 
275 Gray, supra note 15, at 777 (noting that de novo requirement makes it 
more difficult to produce evidence of present or future harm for proponents who 
seek renewals, than those who seek new exemptions). 
276 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,838; Gray, supra note 15, at 780. 
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affected the ability of blind and visually impaired readers to 
engage in non-infringing uses of e-books.277 The Register made 
such a recommendation despite the fact that this class of works 
was exempted for at least seven years.278 The recurring exemption 
itself considerably reduced adverse effects from such a prohibition, 
and thus, made it virtually impossible to show an actual harm.279 
Similarly, in the 2012 Rulemaking the Register recommended 
not renewing the broad 2010 cellphone unlocking exemption, 
because the harm to consumers was a mere inconvenience not 
sufficient to justify continuation of the exemption for a full three-
year period.280 Instead, the Register advised limiting the existing 
exemption to phones purchased within ninety days after the rule 
were to take effect.281 The Register’s argument referred to the fact 
that the market provided “ample alternatives” to consumers as 
more phones were being sold unlocked.282 But such a conclusion 
disregarded the fact that the availability of alternatives was 
attributable in part to the cellphone unlocking exemption granted 
in 2010.283 
 
2. Third Party Assistance 
 
Under current law, the Librarian has no authority to permit 
third party assistance, such as manufacturing and trafficking in 
tools to circumvent TPMs, to help users benefit from the 
exemptions granted by the Librarian.284 This issue was raised in 
the cellphone unlocking debate and Congress has fixed it for 
                                                                                                             
277 Id. 
278 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,837–39; Gray, supra note 15, at 
780, 783–84. 
279 Id. But fortunately, the Librarian overruled the Register’s 
recommendation and granted the renewal. See supra notes 137, 247. 
280 2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 65,260, 65,265–66, 65,278; Gray, 
supra note 15, at 771–72. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Gray, supra note 15, at 771 n.71, 778–79. Unfortunately, this time the 
Librarian affirmed the Register’s recommendation. See infra p. 269 and notes 
299–301. 
284 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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cellphones and other wireless devices.285 Congress, however, has 
not addressed this problem for other software-containing devices 
or products.286 
More recently, the issue has resurfaced in the 2015 
Rulemaking.287 Specifically, with respect to helping circumvent 
TPMs to facilitate repairs of motor vehicles or to access medical 
data in medical implants.288 In this regard, the Register herself 
noted that Congress should consider amending Section 1201 to 
facilitate such assistance.289 For example, by entrusting the 
Librarian to grant exemptions that permit third party assistance to 
exempted users in accessing exempted classes of works, when the 
case so requires.290 
 
3. Enforcement of Exemptions 
 
Presently, no mechanism exists to ensure that copyright holders 
allow users to take advantage of the DMCA exemptions, either 
statutory or adopted by the Librarian. Despite the e-book 
exemption, beneficiaries of this exemption still cannot access 
many e-books and other electronically distributed textual works, 
because major e-book platform providers either use TPMs to limit 
works’ accessibility (e.g., Amazon, Apple, Barnes & Noble), or 
simply lock their devices to certain services (e.g., Amazon 
Kindle).291 A mechanism that would require copyright holders to 
facilitate access to exempted works by eligible users (i.e., 
                                                                                                             
285 See infra pp. 270–71 and note 312. 
286 Id. 
287 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
5. 
288 Id.; see also It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra note 20 (noting that, 
unlike the cellphone exemption, the “medical devices” exemption does not 
include “the explicit ability for patients to get help from others in accessing their 
data” (citing Sherwin Siy, Vice President for Legal Affairs, Pub. Knowledge)). 
289 Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 
5. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 129, 131 (citing the AFB’s Petition for Exemption E-book 
Accessibility for People who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Print Disabled, at 
5, 17–18). 
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beneficiaries of the DMCA exemptions) could potentially resolve 
this issue.292 As will be discussed in Part IV of this Article, some 
European countries, such as the U.K., already employ such a 
mechanism.293 
The issues reviewed above are only the tip of the iceberg and 
the de novo requirement and standard of harm are on the very top 
of it.294 Because the cellphone unlocking debate is one of the best 
examples of the issues that proponents of recurring exemptions 
face in the rulemaking proceeding, it will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
C.  Lessons to Learn: The Unlocking Consumer Choice and 
Wireless Competition Act of 2014 
 
After Congress passed the DMCA and imposed broad 
prohibitions on circumvention of TPMs applied to copyrighted 
works, many cellphone manufacturers and wireless carriers used 
this opportunity to include TPMs in their wares.295 This allowed 
them to lock cellphones they distributed so to preclude users from 
switching to another carrier and to some extent discourage 
competition among manufacturers and service providers.296 Thus, 
despite Congress’ intentions, TPMs were employed not to fight 
piracy or other types of copyright infringement, but primarily to 
control the market of software-containing devices. This was the 
case for most cellphone manufacturers and wireless carriers, until 
2006 when the situation changed dramatically.297 For the first time 
in the rulemaking history, the Register recommended, and the 
                                                                                                             
292 See infra pp. 276–78. 
293 See infra pp. 277–79 and notes 346–48, 357. 
294 It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra note 20 (noting that “a review every 
three years . . . places burdens on users who have to repeatedly ask permission 
for the same activity” (citing Sen. Ron Wyden)). 
295 See Greg Kumparak, Unlocking Your Cell Phone Is Still Illegal, But 
Probably Not For Long, TECH CRUNCH (July 25, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/25/unlocking-your-cell-phone-is-still-illegal-but-
probably-not-for-long; see also Higgins, supra note 49. 
296 Id. 
297 2006 Exemption, supra note 13, at 68,476. 
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Librarian granted, the cellphone unlocking exemption.298 
As a result, the 2006 unlocking exemption allowed cellphone 
owners to circumvent software locks on their phones and to 
connect to a wireless carrier of their choosing.299 In 2010, the 
Register expanded this exemption to cover both firmware and 
software, though adding the caveat that access must be “authorized 
by the operator of the network.”300 Also, the Register added a new 
exemption—the jailbreaking exemption—that permitted cellphone 
owners to circumvent access control TPMs applied to their phones 
in order to install third party applications.301 Despite the Register 
recommending the 2006 and 2010 unlocking exemptions, she 
nevertheless did not recommend a renewal of the 2010 cellphone 
unlocking exemption in 2012.302 Rather, she suggested a limited, 
both in scope and time, exemption.303 Thus, the Register 
recommended to permit unlocking only for the phones acquired 
within ninety days after the rule became effective.304 The Librarian 
accepted the Register’s recommendation and cellphone unlocking 
became illegal again on January 26, 2013.305 This caused an 
immense public outcry that called for an overturning of the 
Librarian’s decision to make unlocking permanently legal.306 The 
Obama Administration not only supported the people’s outcry, but 
also recommended an exemption to cover computer tablets.307 
                                                                                                             
298 Id. 
299 Id.; Singh, supra note 12, at 551 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,476 
(Nov. 27, 2006)). 
300 Singh, supra note 12, at 551–52 (discussing 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 
43,833, 43,838 (July 27, 2010)); 2010 Exemption, supra note 13, at 43,839. 
301 Id. 
302 Register’s Recommendation for the Fifth Rulemaking, supra note 269, 
at 99–100. 
303 Id. 
304 Id.; see also Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 
55,689 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,264–66 (Oct. 26, 2012)). 
305 2012 Exemption, supra note 13, at 65,278. 
306 Make Unlocking Cell Phones Legal, supra note 22. 
307 See R. David Edelman, Senior Advisor for Internet, Innovation, & 
Privacy, Official White House Response To Make Unlocking Cell Phones 
Legal: It's Time to Legalize Cell Phone Unlocking (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/its-time-legalize-cell-phone-
unlocking. 
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The Register and the Librarian were widely criticized for this 
controversial decision and some even went as far as to claim that 
the rulemaking mechanism was inefficient altogether.308 But the 
Register and the Librarian cannot be blamed for the pitfalls of the 
mechanism that they were instructed to follow and enforce. It was 
Congress who created a mechanism without providing clear and 
precise instructions to the Register and the Librarian on how to 
implement it.309 Given the insufficient congressional guidance on 
this matter, the Register and Librarian did the best they could 
under the circumstances. 
The situation that developed around the cellphone unlocking 
exemption required a congressional response. Thus, pressured by 
the public and the President, Congress enacted the Unlocking 
Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act of 2014.310 The 
Act made several important changes. First, the Act substituted a 
broader version of the 2010 cellphone unlocking exemption for the 
2012 version, but allowed the Register to consider any future 
proposals for a cellphone unlocking exemption.311 Second, the Act 
permitted specified third parties to circumvent TPMs at the 
direction of a cellphone or other mobile device owner to connect to 
a different wireless carrier, but only with respect to the reinstated 
2010 cellphone unlocking exemption and any other future 
                                                                                                             
308 Section 1201 Hearing, supra note 13, at 43 (testimony of McSherry, 
Intell. Prop. Dir., EFF) (suggesting that Congress overturn Section 1201). 
309 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(B) (2000); see supra notes 95–98 and 
accompanying text; see also Notice of Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra 
note 9, at 55,689. 
310 Unlocking Consumer Choice & Wireless Competition Act, supra note 
23; Make Unlocking Cell Phones Legal, supra note 22; see also Notice of 
Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,689 (discussing situation 
that developed around the cellphone unlocking issue); see additionally 
Statement from the President on Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless 
Competition Act (July 25, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/07/25/statement-president-unlocking-consumer-choice-and-
wireless-competition-a. 
311 Unlocking Consumer Choice & Wireless Competition Act, supra note 
23; Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 12 
(summarizing the provisions of the Unlocking Consumer Choice & Wireless 
Competition Act). 
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rulemaking exemptions to cover mobile devices.312 Third, the Act 
directed the Librarian to determine as a part of the rulemaking 
proceeding whether to extend the cellphone unlocking exemption 
to include any other wireless devices in addition to cellphones, 
such as computer tablets and other mobile devices.313 
Despite certain benefits that the Act provided, several issues 
were nevertheless left unresolved. For instance, Congress passed 
the issues of unlocking other mobile devices, as well as 
jailbreaking of cellphones and other mobile devices, to the Register 
and the Librarian for consideration within the triennial rulemaking 
proceedings.314 And in the most recent rulemaking, the Librarian 
granted permission to unlock phones, computer tablets, 
smartwatches, and fitness devices,315 as well as to jailbreak phones, 
tablets, and even smart TVs.316 But in three years, consumers will 
still need to fight for these rights de novo.317 Thus, the Unlocking 
Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act provided only a 
very limited solution to a bigger problem with the DMCA 
mechanism. 
However, the cellphone unlocking debate has shown that, 
without the congressional intervention, there is only so much the 
Register and the Librarian can do, as their hands are tied by the 
rigid DMCA provisions. Many, including those in Congress, are 
suggesting it is time for Congress to step in and exercise its 
legislative power and wisdom to amend the DMCA mechanism318. 
                                                                                                             
312 Id. 
313 Unlocking Consumer Choice & Wireless Competition Act, supra note 
23; Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 13. 
314 Unlocking Consumer Choice & Wireless Competition Act, supra note 
23; Make Unlocking Cell Phones Legal, supra note 22; see also Notice of 
Inquiry for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 55,689; Higgins, supra note 
49. 
315 2015 Exemption, supra note 9, at 65,962–63. 
316 Id. at 65,963. 
317 See supra notes 260–61, 265, 267 and accompanying text; see also 
Higgins, supra note 49 (stressing that due to “the frustrating way DMCA 
exemptions are considered, groups like EFF have to return to the Copyright 
Office and Librarian of Congress every three years and argue the case anew”); 
Register’s Recommendation for the Sixth Rulemaking, supra note 33, at 12–13. 
318 See supra notes 25, 28–31; see also It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra 
note 20 (noting that “the fact remains that no matter how many exemptions are 
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IV. SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
The past seventeen years under the DMCA have demonstrated 
that the rulemaking mechanism has its ups and downs, but we must 
keep it for better or for worse. Even those who have voiced against 
this mechanism have at some point acknowledged its legacy and 
importance.319 No regulatory mechanism is perfect and there is 
always room for improvement. And the DMCA mechanism is not 
an exception. But it does not mean that the mechanism should be 
abandoned altogether as some consumer advocacy groups have 
repeatedly suggested.320 Rather, it needs some improvement, a 
second life.  
Recent developments indicate that Congress, the Copyright 
Office, and the public have finally ripened to make such 
improvements. Although the number of opportunities is endless, it 
is important to only focus on workable solutions that will be 
welcomed, or at least tolerated, by both sides—the copyright 
holders and the public at large (represented by consumer advocacy 
groups, educational, scientific research and similar institutions). 
 
A.  Call for Improvement: The Breaking Down Barriers to 
Innovation Act of 2015 
 
Some representatives of Congress have already presented 
possible solutions to the problems with the rulemaking mechanism. 
                                                                                                             
granted, the process for granting exemptions to the DMCA is broken” (citing 
Sen. Ron Wyden)). 
319 For instance, while being overall critical of the DMCA rulemaking, EFF 
did nevertheless recommend back in 2006 a similar periodic review and 
exemption-granting procedure to be established within the U.K. anti-
circumvention law system. See Hinze, supra note 49, at 13–14. 
320 See, e.g., It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra note 20 (arguing that “[t]he 
triennial 1201 rulemaking is a statutory ‘Rube Goldberg’ contraption for which 
there should never have been a need in the first place” (citing Adam Eisgrau, 
Managing Dir., Am. Library Ass’n)); see also supra note 308 and accompanying 
text; see additionally Corynne McSherry, EFF Asks Librarian of Congress to 
Help Correct DMCA Gotcha, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/eff-asks-librarian-congress-help-correct-
dmca-gotcha. 
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The Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015 was 
introduced on April 26, 2015, by Senator Ron Wyden (Oregon) 
and Representative Jared Polis (Colorado).321 The bill’s stated goal 
is to improve the rulemaking process and to ease restrictions on the 
use of certain statutory exemptions to the DMCA.322 
The bill proposes a number of important improvements, 
including: (i) automatic renewal of previously granted exemptions, 
unless the changed circumstances dictate otherwise; (ii) enabling 
the Librarian to consider requests for exemptions outside the 
triennial proceeding; (iii) adding two more statutory factors to be 
considered by the Librarian when analyzing proposals for 
exemptions (specifically, the accessibility of works and 
technologies for persons with disabilities, and the furtherance of 
security research); (iv) easing the burden of proof by changing it 
from “the preponderance-of-evidence” to the “totality-of-the 
evidence,” or the “totality-of-the-circumstances;” (v) shifting the 
burden of proof away from proponents of exemptions; and (vi) 
establishing a presumption for persons with disabilities of being 
likely to be adversely affected, if a TPM applied to a copyrighted 
work that improves accessibility of works and/or technologies to 
such persons hinders non-infringing uses of such a work.323 
Additionally, the bill directs the Librarian of Congress (in 
consultation with the Register of Copyrights and the NTIA’s 
Assistant Secretary) to conduct a study on (i) ways to further ease 
the burden on persons requesting exemptions; (ii) how the 
exemption process can be used to foster security research; and (iii) 
how the exemption process can be expanded to circumvent 
tools.324 
Being welcomed by major public interest advocacy 
organizations, by representatives of the copyright holders and the 
Register herself, a version of this bill has a chance of being passed 
by Congress.325 If enacted, this bill could resolve major problems 
                                                                                                             
321 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
322 Wyden, supra note 28 (providing a summary of the bill and its full text). 
323 Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act, supra note 28. 
324 Id. 
325 See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also The 
Register’s Perspective On Copyright Review, supra note 30, at 21. 
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with the DMCA rulemaking, especially with respect to recurring 
exemptions. Thus, the bill could ease the burdens of proponents for 
renewing exemptions and allow greater certainty and security for 
those who depend on them (educators, researchers, the visually 
impaired, etc.).326 
 
B.  Considering Additional Solutions for Improvement 
 
While the Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act is 
undoubtedly a step forward, it does not, unfortunately, fix all the 
problems with the DMCA rulemaking. Although the Librarian 
would be entrusted to review the exemptions outside the triennial 
proceedings, the prohibition on trafficking in tools to circumvent 
TPMs (both access controls and copy controls) is still outside the 
scope of the rulemaking.327 Even if exemptions automatically 
renew, most users would still not be able to access exempted works 
unless someone creates and distributes the technology to 
circumvent TPMs applied to these works.328 Likewise, a 
presumption of harm to persons with disabilities when TPMs apply 
to a class of works intended to improve accessibility of 
technologies to such persons will not completely resolve the issue. 
As people with disabilities must still build their case before the 
Register and bear their burden, e.g., in defining a class of such 
works, showing that TPM still hinders non-infringing uses of such 
works.329 
Finally, until Congress reconsiders the definition of the acts of 
circumvention of TPMs to only cover the acts that actually infringe 
the copyrights, and not any and all acts unauthorized by copyright 
holders,330 the DMCA scheme, including the DMCA rulemaking 
                                                                                                             
326 Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act, supra note 28 (summary of 
the bill). 
327 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
329 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
330 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(3)(A) (2000) (“[T]o “circumvent a technological 
measure” means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted 
work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a 
technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner.”) 
(emphasis added); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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proceeding, will continue to govern the areas that go well beyond 
the scope of the copyright protection—such as consumer 
protection, public safety, privacy, competition, etc.331 Following 
this logic, Congress might need to consider amending the 
definition of TPMs itself to only include measures that protect 
against copyright infringement, and not against every action 
unauthorized by copyright owners.332 Maybe even to inquire about 
practices in other countries, for instance, by asking the Copyright 
Office to produce a pertinent study.333 
Therefore, without a significant congressional intervention to 
address the above issues, the DMCA mechanism will continue to 
frustrate legitimate uses of copyrighted works and software-
containing devices. 
 
1. Congressional Intervention 
 
In addition to the solutions presented by the Breaking Down 
Barriers to Innovation Act, there are other possible opportunities 
for improvement that Congress should consider. For instance, 
additional or alternative solutions may include: (i) adding Sections 
1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) to the scope of the triennial rulemaking 
to allow trafficking in tools to circumvent TPMs for the classes of 
works exempted by the rulemaking, so that all consumers (not just 
the most sophisticated ones) could benefit from such 
exemptions;334 (ii) including the statutory exemptions within the 
scope of rulemaking to allow the Librarian considering petitions 
                                                                                                             
331 See sources cited supra notes 48–50, 67 and accompanying text; see also 
Letter from Sen. Grassley and Sen. Leahy, supra note 32, at 1. 
332 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(3)(B) (2000) (“[A] technological measure 
“effectively controls access to a work” if the measure, in the ordinary course of 
its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a 
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the 
work.”) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
333 For instance, some European countries, which adopted the EUCD 
provisions that are similar to the DMCA provisions, have nevertheless limited 
their protection of TMPs only to the acts that infringe copyrights. See supra note 
239. 
334 Singh, supra note 12, at 568; see also supra notes 284, 289–90, 328 and 
accompanying text. 
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that seek expansion or modification of current statutory 
exemptions;335 (iii) creating presumptions for recurring exemptions 
(for instance, if the same class of works is exempted for two 
consecutive proceedings, such a class should be presumed 
exempted for future proceedings unless rebutted by opponents;336 
but if exempted for three consecutive proceedings and unopposed, 
then this class becomes permanently exempted);337 (iv) adding 
permanent statutory exemption for blind and visually impaired e-
book readers;338 (v) differentiating burdens and standards of proof 
for petitions that request new exemptions, renewal of existing 
exemptions, and expansion of (or modifications to) existing 
exemptions; (vi) creating a separate simplified proceeding for re-
adoption of existing exemptions, which would lessen the 
administrative burdens on the proponents and the Copyright 
Office; (vii) allowing proponents of recurring exemptions whose 
petitions for renewal were denied to take their case to court as 
means of recourse to the Librarian’s decisions;339 (viii) adding a 
mediation process to the rulemaking mechanism as an additional 
oversight of statutory and rulemaking exemptions (the U.K. model, 
which is discussed below);340 and (ix) creating a separate division 
within the Copyright Office to handle the DMCA matters, such as 
rulemaking proceeding, pertinent copyright studies, mediation 
process (if implemented), etc.341 
 
                                                                                                             
335 Singh, supra note 12, at 569. 
336 Jackson, supra note 21, at 546. 
337 Id. 
338 This would resolve the problems with the Chafee Amendment and help 
to comply with the Marrakesh Treaty. See 17 U.S.C. § 121 (1997); see also 
supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
339 The procedure could be similar to the right of appeal in case of refusal to 
register copyright, which affords copyright registration applicants the 
opportunity to appeal the refusal by initiating a judicial action against the 
Register of Copyrights in federal district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1999); see 
also Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, ch. 1700, sec. 1706 (3d 
ed. 2014), available at http://copyright.gov/comp3/chap1700/ch1700-
administrative-appeals.pdf. 
340 See infra pp. 277–79. 
341  See infra pp. 280–81 and note 360. 
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2. The TPM Complaint Process in the U.K. 
 
In several European countries, when copyright holders do not 
take voluntary steps to afford uses of exemptions adopted by the 
national laws, several procedures are in place to help users to 
nevertheless benefit from these exemptions.342 Thus, in Denmark, 
users may apply directly to a special Copyright License Tribunal, 
and when copyright holders do not comply with the Tribunal’s 
order within four weeks, users may legally circumvent TPMs, so 
long as these users have gained legal access to the work at issue.343 
In Ireland, users may apply to the High Court.344 In other European 
countries, such as Greece, users may seek resolution in mediation, 
and if mediation fails—before the Court of Appeal.345 
The U.K. and Australia have also adopted certain procedures, 
similar to those mentioned above, to entitle government agencies 
with an authority to address the interests of the public at large in 
accessing copyrighted works protected by TPMs.346 Both common 
law countries share similar concerns regarding TPMs as those 
expressed in the United States, namely, that TPMs often prevent 
lawful activities permitted by copyright exceptions.347 Because the 
U.S. legal system has close roots to the U.K. legal system, the 
procedure employed by the U.K. is of most interest and will be 
further discussed below. 
                                                                                                             
342 Ray, supra note 51. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 For instance, under Section 249 of the Australian Copyright Act of 1968 
(amended by the Copyright Amendment Act of 2006), the Governor-General 
has a regulation-making power (similar to the Librarian’s authority in issuing 
final rule) to prescribe new exceptions upon a recommendation of the Minister, 
namely, Attorney-General for Australia (similar to the Register’s 
recommendation to the Librarian), made upon review of submissions by 
interested parties (similar to notice-comment process in the DMCA rulemaking). 
The Minister must make a decision whether to recommend the exception as soon 
as practicable, but not later than within four years of receiving the submission. 
However, since 2006 there has been only one such proceeding, which was held 
in 2012–2013. See supra note 54. 
347 Guidance on the U.K. Complaint Process, supra note 238, at 1, 4; 
Australian Review of TPMs Exceptions, supra note 44, at 12. 
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Similar to U.S. law, U.K. law ensures the right of copyright 
owners to use TPMs to protect their copyrighted works (by 
prohibiting circumvention of such TPMs) and the right of the 
public in accessing such works (by providing certain enumerated 
exceptions to the above prohibitions).348 To ensure that TPMs do 
not unreasonably prevent people from benefiting from exceptions, 
U.K. law also provides for a complaint process.349 This process 
allows users to submit a complaint against a copyright holder to 
the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, where 
the copyright holder prevents users’ activities that are permitted by 
any exception under one of the listed categories.350 
The procedure resembles a mediation process. Before 
complaining to the Secretary, the user must make a bona fide 
attempt to resolve the issue with the copyright holder directly.351 If 
no solution achieved, only then may the user make a complaint to 
the Secretary, using a provided online form.352 Once the user’s 
complaint is accepted for consideration (subject to eligibility 
conditions),353 the Secretary will make another attempt to find a 
                                                                                                             
348 Guidance on the U.K. Complaint Process, supra note 238, at 1 (noting 
that TPMs have “a key role in enabling copyright owners (rightsholders) to offer 
content to consumers,” as well as protecting against piracy). 
349 Id. at 4; see also Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, 1988, c. 
48, § 296ZE(2) (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/4 
8/section/296ZE (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (stating that when the application of 
an effective TPM to a copyright work “prevents a person from carrying out a 
permitted act in relation to that work then that person or a person being a 
representative of a class of persons prevented from carrying out a permitted act 
may issue a notice of complaint to the Secretary of State”); see also The 
Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) 
Regulations, 2014, S.I. 2014/2361, art. 3(2) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/2361/pdfs/uksi_20142361_en.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2015). (amending § 296ZE of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act of 1988 to add that the Act “applies where an individual is prevented 
from making a personal copy of a copyright work, or is restricted in the number 
of personal copies of it which may be made, because of a restrictive measure 
applied by or on behalf of the copyright owner”). 
350 Guidance on the U.K. Complaint Process, supra note 238, at 4 
(providing a list of twenty-five categories). 
351 Id. at 1. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. at 1–2. Complaint is eligible for consideration if the following 
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mutually satisfactory voluntary solution.354 If no solution is found 
on this stage, the Secretary proceeds further.355 The complaint is 
published on its website to allow all interested parties to submit 
comments within a thirty-day period.356 Then, the Secretary 
reviews the record and considers all relevant factors, including the 
availability of alternatives in the market, the user’s ability to 
benefit from the exceptions (these two are similar to the factors 
considered within the DMCA rulemaking), the burdens on the 
copyrights holders, etc.357 Subsequently, the Secretary makes a 
final decision and publishes it.358 
The ultimate goal of this complaint process is to ensure that 
copyright holders, who apply TPMs to their works, do not 
unreasonably or unfairly prevent legitimate activities permitted by 
copyright exceptions to anti-circumvention provisions.359 If such a 
mediation process is adopted within the DMCA scheme, it would 
ensure that copyright holders conform to the limitations imposed 
by statutory and rulemaking exemptions, and intended users are 
not unduly prevented from the benefits of such exemptions. 
 
3. Expansion of the Copyright Office’s Role 
 
The Copyright Office could be entrusted with the mediation 
function discussed above. Additionally, where copyright holders 
combine access controls and copy controls into one TPM applied 
to a copyrighted work that is not exempted by the statute or the 
                                                                                                             
conditions apply: (i) the work the user complains about must be a work that is 
protected by copyright (but is not a computer program); (ii) the user must have 
lawful access to the work (e.g., by having bought it or been given it as a gift); 
(iii) to rely on the personal copying exception, the user must have lawful access 
to the work on a permanent basis (thus, this does not cover works that are 
borrowed, rented, accessed from on-demand streaming services or broadcasts); 
and (iv) the TPM must be preventing the user from benefitting from one of the 
eligible exceptions. Id. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. at 2. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. at 2–4. 
358 Id. at 2. 
359 See supra notes 349–50. 
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rulemaking, the mediation procedure could afford users an 
opportunity to complain to the Copyright Office and ask for a 
temporary permission to access such a work, when necessary for 
lawful copying or another non-infringing use of the work. 
Such agency expansion could be also beneficial in the broader 
context of copyright law.360 The Copyright Office already 
performs important law and policy functions, such as delivering 
copyright studies to Congress and to the public, providing legal 
assistance to federal agencies, as well as conducting rulemakings 
and prescribing regulations that relate to the administration of its 
statutory duties.361 Therefore, it is a natural course of action to 
entrust the Copyright Office with broad mediation function. By 
being engaged in the triennial rulemaking and conducting all the 
proceedings, the Copyright Office is in the best position to 
accommodate the mediation process between the copyright holders 
and consumers. To ensure such broad engagement of the Copyright 
Office in the DMCA scheme, a new division within the Copyright 
Office that will exclusively deal with the various DMCA matters 
might be something Congress considers within the discussion of 
                                                                                                             
360 The Copyright Office’s role in shaping copyright law and respective 
public policies can hardly be underestimated. As rightly noted by the Register 
herself, “[t]he Office plays an integral role in the overall functioning of the 
copyright system.” See Oversight of the U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 93, at 
1 (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright 
Office); see also Singh, supra note 12, at 529 (suggesting to expand “the 
Copyright Office's role in copyright law, due to the tension between regulatory 
copyright legislation and rapid technological advances as well as the Register's 
performance in the DMCA rulemaking process.”); see also supra note 93. 
361 Since 2011, the Copyright Office has delivered to Congress at least eight 
policy studies: Orphan Works and Mass Digitization (June 2015), Music 
Licensing Study (February 2015), Transforming Document Recordation 
(December 2014), Copyright Small Claims (September 2013), Resale Royalties: 
An Updated Analysis (December 2013), Fee Study (November 2013), Federal 
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings (December 2011), Legal 
Issues in Mass Digitization: A Preliminary Analysis and Discussion Document 
(October 2011), and Report on Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act: 
§ 302 (August 2011). See Oversight of the U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 93, 
at 2, 6 (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright 
Office); see also Policy Reports, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/ 
policy/policy-reports.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
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the Copyright Office modernization.362 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, as seen from the previous rulemakings, there is a 
positive trend for the industry—rulemaking exemptions are 
becoming broader both in number and scope.363 If such an 
expansion continues, modified rules of administrative procedure 
prove to be more comprehensive and less burdensome, more 
authority is vested in the Copyright Office, and the precedential 
effect is given to recurring exemptions, the DMCA rulemaking 
mechanism has a good chance for survival and evolvement.364 Not 
only will such changes make the DMCA scheme more up-to-date 
with the currently emerging technological advances, but will also 
ensure a greater flexibility and adaptability of copyright law in the 
future.365 
Given the problems highlighted in this Article, it is time for 
Congress to finally do something about the DMCA rulemaking. 
Despite Congress’ intentions, the DMCA provisions continue to tip 
the balance in favor of the interests of copyright holders, while 
adversely affecting the interests of the public at large. Not only 
does it happen because of the broad DMCA prohibitions and 
drawbacks of the rulemaking proceeding, but also because over the 
last several decades the copyright holders have grown to be a 
powerful and influential community with strong and successful 
lobbying.366 Meanwhile, the interests of the public still remain 
poorly represented, unless some consumer advocacy and public 
                                                                                                             
362 See generally The Register’s Perspective On Copyright Review, supra 
note 30, at 6–10; see also Strategic Plan 2016–2020, supra note 93, at 11–13 
(suggesting ways to modernize the Office). 
363 See sources cited supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
364 Jackson, supra note 21, at 544–46. 
365 Singh, supra note 12, at 527–28. 
366 See, e.g., It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, supra note 20 (noting that petitions 
for exemptions on behalf of consumers “have to be written and argued, at great 
expense, by donation-supported public-interest groups, while the companies that 
profit by locking you out of the lawful enjoyment of your property get to divert 
some of those gains to fighting the public interest groups” (citing Cory 
Doctorow, Co-Editor, the Boing Boing blog)). 
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interest group such as Public Knowledge, Center for Democracy & 
Technology, or Electronic Frontier Foundation367 fights for 
consumers’ rights. Until the cellphone unlocking issue emerged, 
the public was not sufficiently involved in the process. Fortunately, 
this situation has changed, and the increase in public awareness 
and engagement will be forthcoming. 
It is time for Congress to take action and amend the existing 
DMCA fail-safe mechanism that is becoming more “fail” than 
“safe.” The Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless 
Competition Act of 2014 and the Breaking Down Barriers to 
Innovation Act of 2015 set it on the right track. But Congress must 
consider other possible solutions for improvement and fix the 
DMCA rulemaking to ensure a healthy balance between the 
copyright holders’ rights in protecting their works from piracy and 
the rights of the public in accessing such works for education, 
scholarship, journalism, scientific research, and other socially 
beneficial activities. After all, advancement and dissemination of 
knowledge is “the only guardian of true liberty” 368 and progress. 
  
                                                                                                             
367 See About Us, PUB. KNOWLEDGE https://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
about-us (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); About CDT, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH., https://cdt.org/about (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); About EFF, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
368 Madison, supra note 1. 
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